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Executive Summary  
Introduction to the Conflict Research 
Programme 
 
The overall goal of the Conflict Research Programme 
(CRP) is to provide an evidence-based strategic re-
orientation of international engagement in places 
apparently afflicted by the world’s most intractable violent 
conflicts. Its premise is that in these places, the ability of 
public authorities to provide even the most basic level of 
governance is subject to the functioning of the ‘real 
politics’ of gaining, managing and holding power, which we 
argue functions as a ‘political marketplace’. This approach 
helps explain the frustrations of state-building and 
institutionally-focused engagement; it can also inform the 
design of improved interventions, which reduce the risk 
and impact of conflict and violence in developing 
countries, alleviating poverty and insecurity. A key 
objective of our research, and a key contribution to the 
‘Better Delivery’ agenda within DFID, is to make policies 
better targeted, more nuanced and rooted in a clear 
understanding of the social condition that undergirds 
persistent contemporary conflict.  
 
The locations for research are Democratic Republic of 
Congo, Iraq, Somalia, South Sudan and Syria. Our central 
hypothesis is that governance in these difficult places is 
dominated by the logic of a political marketplace. These 
political markets are turbulent, violent and integrated into 
regional and global networks of power and money. We also 
hypothesise that moral populism (most visible in identity 
politics, persecuting ideologies and violent extremism) is a 
counterpart to the marketisation of politics, and the two 
flourish in conditions of persistent uncertainty, conflict and 
trauma. Current policy frameworks and tools can neither 
capture the everyday realities of politics and governance in 
these difficult places, nor adjust to the dynamics of 
contested power relations. External interventions risk 
being enmeshed in logics of power and may end up 
inadvertently supporting violence and authoritarianism. At 
the same time, in all war-torn spaces, there are relatively 
peaceful zones: what we term ‘pockets of civicness’. These 
might be territorial (local ceasefires, or inclusive local 
authorities) social (civil society groups helping the 
vulnerable or countering sectarian narratives, or 
customary courts solving disputes fairly) or external 
(interventions that regulate flows of political finance). 
 
The CRP will generate evidence-based, operationally 
relevant research that can enable real-time analysis of the 
dynamics of conflict, contestation, ‘civicness’ and public 
authority, enabling better interventions to manage and 
resolve armed conflict, reduce violence, and create 
conditions for more accountable and transparent 
governance. A core component of the CRP is to contribute 
to a better understanding of “what works” in addressing 
violent conflict across our research sites. We will develop 
comparative understanding of how different interventions 
affect violent conflict and the risk of renewed violent 
conflict, across our research sites. We will also examine 
the contextual factors that affect the effectiveness of 
these interventions. Intervention areas selected for 
comparative research: Security interventions; civil society 
and community mediation interventions; resource 
interventions; and interventions designed to strengthen 
authority and legitimacy, including at the sub-national level. 
We envisage emerging findings from our political 
economy analysis of conflict drivers to shape our 
comparative analysis of specific interventions.  
 
Our research methods include (a) comparative political 
ethnography (b) refined datasets (c) models of violence 
and political business (d) socio-political mapping of the 
structural drivers of conflict and the groups involved in 
political mobilisation and coercion and (e) action research 
exploring agents of change. We have a unique and robust 
infrastructure of local researchers and civil society 
networks across all our sites that will facilitate both 
fieldwork research and remote research. The CRP team is 
already closely engaged with key political processes – and 
regional actors - in the countries concerned, designed to 
promote peace, humanitarian action, human rights and 
democracy. This engagement is a key part of our method 
and will ensure that evidence-based research is effectively 
communicated to institutions engaged in trying to reduce 
the risk and impact of violent conflict in our research sites. 
Our emphasis is upon a mix of research methods and 
mechanisms for engaging in policy and practice. In line 
with this flexible approach, we will hold an annual in-
country workshop with each DFID country office, and key 
stakeholders, to work through the implications of our 
research for them in a practical, flexible and responsive 
way. This will be supplemented by regular written and face-
to-face/virtual communication with country staff.  
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CRP Research on Somalia 
 
The stakes are very high for not ‘getting Somalia wrong’ 
another time. Creating a viable polity in Somalia, not prone 
to violent conflict that generates humanitarian crisis and 
instability requires a sound understanding of the drivers of 
armed conflict and governance crisis, and ‘what works’ in 
addressing these challenges. Policymakers do not have 
the luxury of a disengaged stance. Somalia poses the 
particular challenge that is one of a kind: ‘what works’ 
elsewhere may not work well in Somalia.  
 
The political marketplace is the most appropriate 
framework for understanding Somali governance, 
including the drivers of conflict and political coalition 
management, since the 1980s. The consolidation of public 
authority in Somalia - including attempts to build state 
capacity and legitimacy – requires attention to the logic of 
political marketplace. Political economy analysis alone, 
however, is not enough. We also require a much better 
understanding of the powerful ideologies that mobilise 
violence, as well as the counter-logics that encourage 
peaceful and economically productive relations between 
citizens. 
 
In this synthesis paper, we take the Somali Compact of 
September 2013 as a starting point, and examine the 
literature relevant to the drivers of conflict and ‘what works’ 
in interventions to improve stability in Somalia.  The Somali 
Compact, in common with the Busan ‘New Deal for 
Engagement in Fragile States’ from which it is drawn, is not 
a political-economic theory of why states fail and how they 
can be put back together. Rather, it is a big tent under 
which national governments, development and security 
partners, and other stakeholders can come together in a 
common process in which, despite their differences, they 
can work towards overcoming state fragility. This allows 
for diversity and flexibility: the policy-related research 
agenda outlined in this paper makes use of this flexibility. 
 
The CRP will undertake operationally relevant research in 
Somalia to explore the political economy drivers of conflict, 
as well as the ideologies and conditions that encourage 
popular violence; and those that encourage peace and 
accountability. This will inform those in HMG who engage 
directly with Somali officials, such as during political and 
diplomatic negotiations. It will also be crucial for wider 
analysis of HMG’s broader interventions in Somalia. The 
empirical baseline for exploring and understanding the 
Somali political marketplace, as well as the various forms 
of public authority which have emerged, is patchy, at best. 
Our research agenda reflects the opportunity to establish 
new baseline empirical material, which can inform our 
current research but also develop new avenues of inquiry. 
This means our agenda is also flexible, and able to respond 
to changes the in the overall context, and to new questions 
that may arise as a consequence of the initial 
investigations. 
  
Research will be undertaken using a comparative case 
study approach, focusing on key areas linked to the 
political economy of violence and conflict in Somalia 
(including Puntland and Somaliland, as well as northeast 
Kenya, south-eastern Ethiopia and Dijbouti). Among topics 
to be addressed are locally and externally driven attempts 
at state-building and peacebuilding in the Somali context; 
the functioning of the business sector in the conflict and 
post-conflict setting; contestation over land, with particular 
attention to urban real estate; the dynamics of clan, 
nationalism and political Islam and their interactions with 
the political marketplace; security arena stabilisation, in 
light of the lack of a centralist security sector in southern 
Somalia; and community level mediation and dialogue 
aimed at peacebuilding and dispute resolution.  
 
CRP research will be informed by a series of workshops 
that develop the metrics and measurements for political 
markets, including tools to measure economic power and 
its interaction with political power. It will also be informed 
by broader theoretical development of how and why 
persecuting ideologies emerge and flourish, and how and 
where this can be countered through alternative, peaceful 
logics of governance. Our comparative approach and 
findings will highlight a range of possible solutions to 
problems that have beleaguered international 
interventions: helping donors to understand where 
something has or has not worked and why. As part of the 
CRP’s objective to encourage the emergence of better 
networks between Somali researchers, we will leverage the 
existing links to Marqaati; Academy for Peace and 
Development, Heritage Institute for Policy Studies and the 
Observatory of Conflict and Violence Prevention. We will 
also collaborate with Peace Direct, who have pioneered the 
‘peace exchange’ methodology, as a means of 
synthesizing and systematising local knowledge and 
about experiences of peacebuilding, community mediation 
and reconciliation.  
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Introduction 
 
The first part of this paper combines a summary of the key 
debates on Somalia, and a review of relevant literature. 
This is structured around analysis of the international 
interventions that the CRP proposes to examine: building 
state capacity and legitimacy, the ‘security arena’ and 
security sector reform (SSR), the business sector and 
natural resource management, community level dialogue 
and mediation and humanitarian crisis and response. The 
gender dynamics of conflict and violence are also 
explored. We elaborate on the analytical framework used 
by the CRP, namely the political marketplace, moral 
populism, ‘civicness’ and public authority, as and when 
appropriate. Regional dimensions and dynamics, as they 
intersect with the trajectory of Somalia’s conflict, are 
touched on in passing, and examined in greater detail in 
the synthesis paper on the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea. 
The final part develops the key questions for the CRP 
research agenda. 
 
Any research based on the academic literature on Somalia 
runs into the enormous obstacle that access for 
researchers has been extremely limited, primarily for 
reasons of safety, and therefore the depth and breadth of 
the primary research has been very limited. Because 
access has been so uneven, there are important areas—
such as the governance practices in areas under the 
authority of al-Shabaab—that are almost wholly neglected. 
However, the challenges of studying Somalia are such that 
only those who are courageous and innovative are ready 
to undertake research, with the result that the literature is 
remarkable for its creativity in tackling the challenges 
posed by the country.  
 
A further challenge is created by the nature of much of the 
policy or ‘grey literature’ which analyses or informs 
international intervention in the Somali setting. Such 
literature is often commissioned by specific donors and 
never published, or shared beyond a small audience within 
the commissioning institution. As far as possible, the 
researchers have tried to access such analysis, but even 
where this was possible, it is not always permitted to cite 
such studies, which remain confidential. The analysis 
which follows takes into consideration what material we 
had access to, while respecting confidentiality. This, also, 
is part of the nature of the research and policy environment 
in the Somali setting.  
                                                     
1 For a working definition of grey literature, see Jessica Hagen-
Zanker and Richard Mallett, ‘How to do a rigorous, evidence 
focused literature review in international development,’ ODI 
Working Paper, September 2013, 
Methodology  
 
The paper draws upon a literature search conducted 
according to the following method. Instead of a traditional, 
comprehensive literature review of all the social science 
literature on conflict in Somalia, this search focused on 
identifying empirically grounded social science literature 
on the drivers and effect of conflict in Somalia. The search 
process itself consisted of two stages: a database driven 
search, and a ‘snowball’ search which augmented the 
database search and also formed the basis of our study of 
the ‘grey’ literature.1  
 
Initially, eight social science databases were searched: 
Taylor and Francis journals, JSTOR, Cambridge journals, 
Oxford journals, Hein Online, Wiley Online, SAGE journals, 
and Project MUSE. The search results from these 
databases were then cross-checked against the search 
results from Tufts University’s library search engines. One 
primary search string was used, and for each database a 
secondary search was carried out to supplement the 
results of the first search string.2  
 
The following inclusion/exclusion criteria were applied: 
 
 Language: Only studies published in English were 
selected – this was recognised as an unavoidable 
limitation, given resource constraints, although in the 
case of Somalia this will not affect the results 
significantly.   
 Focus on empirical data: From our search results we 
only selected studies that contained or referenced 
local level empirical data. For instance, we excluded 
comparative studies which were not based on 
empirical data/findings generated by the authors.   
 ‘Cut-off’ points: In both searches, after a preliminary 
scan it became clear that the degree of relevance 
decreased substantially after the first 120 articles on 
most databases. Results after the first 120 were not 
considered.  
 
Such a systematic database misses key academic 
literature and almost all the policy-related literature. A 
‘snowball’ technique was therefore used to supplement the 
database search, where we (a) examined relevant social 
science literature known to us through our own research 
and expertise (including the books and grey literature in the 
personal collections of the lead researchers), and (b) 
https://www.odi.org/sites/odi.org.uk/files/odi-
assets/publications-opinion-files/8572.pdf.  
2 The initial search string used was {“political economy” AND 
“conflict” AND “Somalia”}.   
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examined relevant footnotes and bibliographies of the 
articles and books the database searches had yielded.  
Key Debates on Conflict Drivers and 
‘What Works’ in Somalia 
 
For most of the last 30 years, Somalia has been defined by 
the problems it has caused for the rest of the world, 
including its immediate neighbours. Somalia has been 
identified with warlords whose militiamen shoot down U.S. 
helicopters, refugees who become social casualties in 
host countries, pirates, smugglers, terrorists and hosts of 
terrorists. In designing policies and programmes for 
Somalia, ‘what works’ for Somalis has commonly been 
secondary to the urgent priorities of others. 
Understandably, this has not been a recipe for success. 
 
Somali politics and conflict can be analysed as a four-level 
system, containing conflict drivers at the global, regional, 
national and local levels. The factors driving the conflict at 
each level are independent, but the effects of the political 
conflicts at any one level influence those at the adjoining 
levels up and down. The combination of these four 
interlinked levels generates enormous complexity (de 
Waal 2017). By way of visualising what this means, 
consider the simplest four-level system in physics, namely 
the quadruple pendulum. A single pendulum has such 
regular and predictable motion that it can be used for 
timekeeping. A double pendulum is complex: even a minor 
variation in the initial conditions leads to very different 
patterns. A triple pendulum is near-chaotic (in the 
mathematical sense) and a quadruple pendulum is so 
complex that it requires a supercomputer to model over 
even short periods of time.3 The pendulum model is 
instructive because it allows us to envision how the linked 
pendulums transmit kinetic energy from one to another, 
just as conflict dynamics at one level influence those at the 
other (as though through transmission of energy). 
Stabilisation (leading to peace-making and state-building) 
requires each level to be addressed, either simultaneously 
or in sequence. Most successful efforts at stabilising a 
country riven by armed conflict begin with bringing the 
global and regional levels under control so that they are not 
transmitting conflict energy to the national level. This then 
allows local conflicts to be addressed. The particular 
challenge of Somalia is that the regional, national and local 
levels all independently have high energy inputs.   
 
International policymakers recognise that their first 
challenge is obtaining sufficient consensus among the key 
                                                     
3 For a visual representation, see: 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=d0Z8wLLPNE0 
international actors that their respective efforts do not 
negate or undermine one another. In that respect, the 
September 2013 Somali Compact is an enormous step 
forward and the foundation of future engagement. 
Drawing upon the Busan ‘New Deal for Engagement in 
Fragile States’, the Somali Compact allows diverse 
international partners, each of which has its own political 
interests and priorities, and often a distinct doctrine of 
security cooperation or development partnership, to work 
together under a common schema that, in principle at 
least, affords ownership and leadership to Somalis. The 
Somali Compact has enabled the establishment of 
agreement to support the Somali federal, provincial and 
municipal institutions, the African Union peace support 
operation AMISOM, the Somali Security Architecture, and 
a range of local governance and peacebuilding initiatives 
including those contained within the Somalia Stability 
Fund. There are notable gaps in the Somali Compact, for 
example the position of Somaliland and the role of the 
business community, but there is no reason in principle 
why these gaps could not be filled.  
 
The New Deal and Somali Compact do not contain a theory 
of the political economy of drivers of conflict, but they do 
have an implicit theory of change, namely that building 
capable governance institutions is the foundation of 
stabilisation. This is a variant of the approach in the World 
Bank’s 2011 World Development Report (World Bank 
2011). The WDR envisaged a spiral of post-conflict 
governance improvement, with inevitable obstructions and 
setbacks on an upward trajectory. The principal drawback 
of this approach (and other similar ones) is that the drivers 
and dynamics of these setbacks are not sufficiently 
analysed or theorised: they are seen as secondary factors. 
 
Within the broad tent of the Somali Compact it is possible 
to accommodate widely divergent approaches to 
stabilisation and state-building. While reviews of the New 
Deal have stressed that it focuses on technical capacity at 
the expense of political dialogue (Hooley et al 2014), in the 
Somali context it cannot be separated from political 
negotiations including hard-won compromises. The High-
Level Task Force for implementing the New Deal, 
established within the Presidency, stressed political 
negotiations. However, the absence of an agreed 
framework is also evident in the fact that the New Deal 
partners have not produced a common fragility 
assessment, and the fact that Middle Eastern partners 
have separate and parallel modes of engagement. As well 
as the problem of complexity, there are several political 
and institutional challenges to conducting such an 
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exercise. Paramount among these is that several external 
actors prioritise different threats, and the involvement of 
external actors is closely tied up with the conflict dynamics 
themselves. Indeed, some external actors are engaged in 
part to neutralise or counteract the presence of other 
external actors. 
 
Even among the international partners most profoundly 
committed to a Somali-led state-building process, there 
are significant differences in priorities and strategies. In a 
short and illuminating commentary, Ken Menkhaus 
(2014b) has distinguished between two contrasting 
philosophies of statebuilding, which he calls the ‘Marshall 
Plan’ and the ‘Social Contract’.  
 
The ‘Marshall Plan’ school of thought on Somalia—the 
belief that urgent security imperative requires a 
massive infusion of financial, technical, and military 
support to ‘prime the pump’ of the collapsed 
government and win legitimacy from the Somali 
people by delivering jobs, security, and basic services. 
State weakness is at the core of the crisis; therefore the 
goal of strengthening the central government overrides 
all other priorities. Gradualist approaches, from this 
perspective, will doom the current government to 
failure and perpetuate the conflict trap it has been 
locked into for 25 years. 
 
The ‘social contract’ school of thought on state-
building in Somalia—the belief that successful state-
building first requires a legitimate government, which 
in turn depends upon greater local ownership of 
processes ... From this view, government legitimacy 
must be earned and not bought. Donors embracing 
this view have tended to privilege peacebuilding over 
state-building, and have looked to support more local-
level, inclusive, and organic forms of governance and 
representation. They have also been more wary of 
government abuse of power and funding, and more 
conflict-sensitive to the impact of their aid in the 
country. In practice, this school of thought has tended 
to gravitate towards a ‘go slow’ approach to aid to the 
series of transitional governments from 2000 to 2012, 
and in some cases has been more inclined to work 
around rather than through Somali governments with 
poor track records of accountability. 
 
Social scientists are naturally predisposed towards 
painstaking, context-sensitive and people-focused ‘social 
contract’ approaches. But Somali realities have been 
shaped by dramatic military and political events which 
mean that the slow pace of these kinds of preferred 
processes means that they are perennially at risk of being 
swamped by the urgent priorities of more powerful actors. 
(Or, we cannot hope that stabilising the lowest, local level 
pendulum will on its own stabilise the national level.) 
 
The Conflict Research Programme differs in that it places 
the drivers and dynamics of the setbacks at the centre of 
its analysis. It sees the process of institutional growth as 
often being subordinated to the logic of ‘real politics’, and 
in particular the dynamic of transactional politics in a 
‘political marketplace.’ This is highly relevant to Somalia 
and the New Deal/Somali Compact: progress in building 
the new Somali state and its governance and security 
institutions depends upon overcoming these forces. The 
‘political marketplace framework’ departs from most 
existing social and political science frameworks, which 
focus on the regularities of institutions and slow 
processes of state formation, to address the more 
immediate questions of how political power is exercised in 
conditions of turbulence and unpredictable change. It 
envisions the politics of a fragile or conflict-affected 
country as akin to limited competition or oligopolistic 
rivalry in a market. The ‘energy’ of the conflict is 
determined by a number of factors, especially the inflow of 
political funds and the intensity of rivalries. In the Somali 
case, the high level of financial flows by citizens abroad 
(remittances) and businesses, quite independent of 
governmental control in Somalia or anywhere else, means 
that the local and national levels of conflict have a high 
level of independent energy. Meanwhile there is also a 
large number of regional and extra-regional players active 
in Somalia’s political and security arena, each connected 
to national and local partners or clients.   
 
The CRP also deals with public authority and the means 
whereby that can be constituted, sustained, and gained 
legitimacy. The concept of public authority utilised by the 
CRP includes state institutions but is not confined to them: 
any institution at a level higher than the family, which 
commands legitimacy and compliance, may be 
considered a form of public authority. In a situation such 
as Somalia in which state institutions have been absent, 
remain weak today, and in many cases must contend with 
other forms of social and political organisation to claim 
legitimacy, this is clearly a useful starting point.  
 
A political marketplace approach begins top-down, with 
political finance and the regulation of political bargaining 
and entry into the political arena. There are two principal 
sources of political funding in Somalia: (a) the business 
community and (b) regional players (almost all in the 
Middle East). The CRP Somalia research focuses on the 
business community, while the wider Horn of Africa/Red 
Sea programme engages with the regional players, 
including their financial dealings and their security 
engagement. 
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One of the principal outputs of the CRP is developing a 
toolkit for the metrics and methods of assessing a political 
marketplace. This component of the workplan will be 
pursued through a series of workshops involving relevant 
academics, and members of the policy/practitioner 
community including DFID economists and country 
advisors, from the five CRP countries. The political 
marketplace toolkit will be developed through an iterative 
process involving theoretical development and feedback 
from the countries concerned. This is outlined in a 
separate paper for the CRP inception report. The toolkit will 
enable researchers and policymakers to understand how 
everyday transactional politics functions, under what 
conditions it is heading towards crisis or towards stability, 
and how external actions may affect it.  
Political Economy and Political 
Markets  
 
The debate between the exponents of a ‘Marshall Plan’ and 
advocates of a ‘social contract’ is particularly salient 
because Somalia has been so long without a functional 
central government, and therefore has developed a 
political economy in the absence of a state.  
 
Some basic financial parameters of the Somali challenge 
are contained in the reports of the World Bank Group and 
FGS Aid Coordination Unit (World Bank Group 2016; 2017). 
The following graph shows the relative importance of 
various different financial flows relative to the country’s 
GDP (World Bank Group 2017, p. 4): 
 
 
This should be elaborated in several ways. First, ODA is 
split roughly evenly between country-programmable aid 
(CPA) and humanitarian assistance. (Though the donor 
profiles for CPA and humanitarian relief are very different: 
notably, the U.S. plays a major role in humanitarian 
assistance but not CPA.) Debt relief, another component 
of ODA, is negligible. 
 
Second, there are substantial security cooperation funds. 
These include peacekeeping contributions, security and 
intelligence cooperation, and direct payments for security 
services. These data are extraordinarily hard to find. The 
World Bank estimates ‘support for enforcement aspects of 
peacekeeping’ at approximately $350 million per year 
during 2015-17 (World Bank Group 2017, p. 25). U.S. total 
assistance to Somalia has been in excess of $300 million 
per year, much of which goes to the security sector, plus 
additional unrecorded payments to the National 
Intelligence and Security Agency (NISA). There is no 
agreed range of figures for security cooperation financial 
flows, but they can be conservatively estimated at $400 
million per year. 
 
Third, a number of countries do not report their figures to 
the World Bank and FGS Aid Coordination Unit. Among 
these are almost all Middle Eastern countries: Qatar, 
Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and UAE, though some 
estimates are obtained from the Somali authorities. 
 
The following graph uses the figures from the World 
Bank/Aid Coordination Unit reports, plus the security 
assistance estimate, to give a broader picture of financial 
flows. 
 
 
 
These figures show just how weak the central government 
is compared to other actors: individuals, businesses, 
donors, and security actors. 
 
Only about 8% of ODA is delivered ‘on treasury’, directly to 
the FGS Ministry of Finance. This is well short of the 15% 
target agreed by donors. This is not the same as ‘on 
budget’ because it includes substantial contributions that 
are separate from the budgetary process. Half of the ‘on 
treasury’ contributions in 2016 were a one-time donation 
from Saudi Arabia and payments from Turkey (World Bank 
Group 2017 p. 10). 
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The political marketplace framework has advantages in a 
country such as Somalia in that it considers the question 
of ‘statehood’ as a secondary question to political 
bargaining. Similarly, the rule-bound functioning of 
institutions is considered subordinate to the political 
purposes to which the resources, personnel and symbolic 
authority of an institution can be used. The leading political 
marketplace analysis of Somalia is Alex de Waal’s The Real 
Politics of the Horn of Africa (de Waal 2015). This draws on 
literature including: Compagnon (2013) on the nature of 
the Siyad Barre state; Jamal (1988) on the 1980s parallel 
economy; Coolidge and Rose-Ackerman (1997) and World 
Bank (1991) on corruption and the crisis of the 1980s; 
Powell, Ford and Nowrasteh (2006) and Leeson (2007) on 
economic resilience following the collapse of the state, as 
well as Collins on the telecoms sector (2009a, 2009b); and 
Warah (2012) on corruption in the Transitional Federal 
Government. The recent analysis by Aisha Ahmad (2017) 
of the cooperation between businessmen and Islamists in 
the Somali ‘security bazaar’ is a complementary war 
economy framework. 
 
The political marketplace analysis of the crisis and 
collapse of the Siyad Barre government centres on the 
inability of the ruler to regulate and dominate the political 
market. The primary reason for the collapse of the 
government was not a lack of resources to buy loyalties 
but a high price of loyalty and a heavy discount on the 
government’s loyalty payments. However much Siyad 
Barre spent on trying to buy loyalty, he could not 
overwhelm the resources available to his rivals, and more 
particularly, he could not convince his clients or potential 
clients that he was a reliable patron, so that they regarded 
corrupt payments not as entailing an obligation to support 
him, but rather as an entitlement that they could pocket, 
and still defect to the opposition as opportunity arose. The 
prediction of government failure became a self-fulfilling 
prophecy, like a stock market crash or a run on the bank. 
 
The root of Siyad Barre’s failure was his inability to regulate 
(restrict) entry to the political marketplace (opposition 
groups could be established at will) and inability to prevent 
those he paid from abandoning him. The resources his 
government controlled were dwarfed by remittances and 
the private sector—the pattern that we see today. Once the 
political market had been deregulated in this manner, it 
was extraordinarily hard to re-regulate it. Subsequent 
efforts to establish a central authority have suffered from 
exactly the same problem, which is that the purported 
central ruler is no more than one player among many in a 
highly competitive political marketplace. 
 
One possible route to stabilisation and the establishment 
of a functional government is illustrated by the explanation 
for Somaliland’s success, according to the political 
marketplace framework (de Waal 2015). This explanation 
hinges on the role of the business sector and the providers 
of political finance, who, at the critical period during 1992-
94, adopted a coordinated approach towards financing a 
central authority (with a security sector) and denying 
finance to rivals. This was possible because of the 
particular circumstances prevailing at the time, including 
the readiness of the business leaders to cooperate with 
one another (in turn a product of their common reliance on 
livestock exports through a single port, and the absence of 
zero-sum property disputes in the territory), the lack of 
alternative sources of political funding and very limited 
expectations that any such sources would be forthcoming 
(related to the absence of a recognised government and 
so lack of official aid, and lack of rents from minerals), and 
the well-structured process of political negotiations.  
 
The very different circumstances prevailing in Mogadishu 
and south-central Somalia indicate that there can be no 
simple replication of the Hargaisa experience. But the 
successful management of the Somaliland political 
market suggests that the analysis has lessons, including: 
coordinating political finance as an intrinsic part of 
establishing a political settlement; addressing disputes 
within the business class as part of that settlement; and 
structuring the political negotiations accordingly. The 
closest that Mogadishu came to experiencing such a 
political settlement was under Islamist authority: the 
Islamists were able to run more efficient and less corrupt 
administrations (Marchal 2009, 2011; Chonka 2016). 
 
Aisha Ahmad (2017) argues that businessmen in Somalia 
found Islamists commercially useful in that they were able 
to lower costs and increase levels of trust. Unlike clan-
based political-military organisations that inevitably were 
confined to certain localities, and established checkpoints 
on their boundaries that exacted payments from traders, 
Islamists were able to control larger territories crossing 
clan or ethnic lines without internal checkpoints, and were 
able to establish trust and enforce contracts on the basis 
of common Islamic faith and law. Thus an Islamic ‘proto-
state’ emerged in Mogadishu in 2005-06, and has 
continued in remnant form in Al-Shabaab controlled areas 
subsequently. Once in a position of power, the UIC was 
able to act against popular sentiment (e.g. in banning khat 
consumption and watching televised sports) and against 
their business sponsors (banning tobacco and increasing 
taxes). Ahmad sees the business-Islamist alliance as 
hazardous for a second reason: it invited external military 
intervention.  
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Building State Capacity and Legitimacy 
 
Following the Turkish and UK-led engagement in Somalia 
since 2011, and especially the 2013 Somali Compact, state 
capacity and legitimacy have been central concerns for 
external observers and policymakers. The Busan ‘New 
Deal for Engagement in Fragile States’ and the Somali 
Compact are exemplars of a well-established trend in post-
conflict reconstruction and state-building pursued by the 
UK, other OECD governments and the World Bank since 
the 1990s. These have a mixed record of success. When 
the New Deal and Somali Compact were adopted, it is fair 
to say that the consensus among scholars of Somalia’s 
political economy was that a conventional state-building 
approach was unlikely to succeed. 
 
Standard accounts of the Somali crisis begin with 
reference to the collapse of the Siyad Barre government in 
January 1991 (e.g. Hesse 2010; Pham 2011), implying that 
the principal challenge facing Somalia is to reconstruct a 
government, following which the country’s other problems 
can be addressed (see, for example, ICG 2008). Specialists 
on Somalia counter that Somali state collapsed for 
particular reasons which must be understood if there is to 
be any successful attempt at reconstructing a state. 
Moreover, the particular form of the Somali state which 
collapsed over the period 1988-91 has specific legacies for 
Somali political actors in the present (Kapteijns 2013; 
Menkhaus 2014c).  
 
Somalia over the last 25 years provides a natural 
experiment in how public functions including security, the 
regulation of commerce, taxation, the resolution of 
disputes, and the provision of services, function (or fail to 
function) in the absence of a recognised state. Public 
authority can be manifest at the local level, to the extent 
that Menkhaus (2014a) has written about a ‘functional 
failed state’ which echoes the wider African phenomenon 
of ‘governance without government’ (Raeymaekers et al 
2008). Menkhaus’s work on the role of the local 
administration in peacebuilding in Wajir, Kenya (Menkhaus 
2008), and more recently of municipal administration in 
Somalia (Menkhaus 2014a, 2014b) has highlighted 
aspects of ‘functional’ governance below the level of the 
state. His conclusion is that in instances where functioning 
institutions emerged at local level, these were only rarely 
externally supported, and in those cases required very 
specific contextualisation, rather than a template 
approach (Menkhaus 2014b). Resources could be more 
successfully channeled to municipal administrations 
where these function, and some degree of social contract 
is in evidence (Menkhaus 2014a). The overall picture that 
emerges highlights the limits of ‘Marshall Plan’ style, large-
scale infusions of assistance, which is likely to fuel the 
existing dynamics of corruption and insecurity (Hagmann 
2016; Menkhaus 2014b).  
 
The Somali Compact framework allows for diverse 
approaches to building institutions across Somalia. At one 
level the federal statebuilding process continues the 
‘building blocks’ approach mooted two decades ago in the 
wake of the collapse of the UN intervention (Bryden 1999). 
At another, it focuses attention and assistance on the 
central authorities in Mogadishu. Mosley (2015) examines 
the tension between the dynamics underpinning 
internationally supported, national level activities (largely in 
Mogadishu) related to the institutions of the state and the 
agendas influencing the formation of aspiring federal 
member state administrations in Kismayo (Jubbaland), 
Baidoa (Southwest Somalia) and Galkayo/Cadaado 
(Galmudug). While it is difficult to imagine that these 
efforts reflect a bottom-up driven process of political 
organisation, Hoehne (2016) underscores the more locally 
embedded and informed political processes in Puntland 
and Somaliland, and (by extension) questions the ability of 
the Somali Federal Government in Mogadishu to impose 
an order outside the capital. In practice, the member state 
formation process, and the ad hoc mechanisms for 
political dialogue between elites with power bases in 
Mogadishu or other regions, reflect a degree of 
pragmatism, which, although dependent on external 
financial support to survive, have assumed a degree of 
functionality.  
 
International assistance has become an enduring fact of 
political life in Somalia, to the extent that it is no longer 
realistic to envision a political process devoid of external 
engagement. Hagmann (2016) explored the 
contradictions inherent in the dependence on external 
assistance—particularly in terms of the capacity of an 
extroverted political economy to produce locally 
legitimate, stable and accountable outcomes. In effect, 
external financial flows fuel the dynamics the international 
community seeks to contain—especially in terms of 
reducing insecurity. 
 
The Somaliland Exception  
 
Another sub-theme of the literature has been the relative 
success of the Republic of Somaliland in avoiding state 
failure, or to be precise, quickly re-establishing a functional 
governing authority following state collapse in 1991-92. 
Somaliland’s economic and political stability and its 
democratic record are remarkable, particularly by contrast 
to the experience of south-central Somalia. Various 
reasons have been forwarded for the successes of 
Somaliland, including the common clan-family identity of 
the majority the population, the wisdom of clan elders, the 
11          Somalia Synthesis Paper, 2017  
relative scarcity of international intervention and the low 
levels of official development assistance, and the 
prominent role of business interests in determining a 
political settlement. The leading book on this topic is 
Bradbury (2008). Walls (2014) traces the various phases 
of negotiated and contested development of a 
constitutional, electoral order in Somaliland, highlighting 
both its achievements and limitations. The continual 
renegotiation of the political settlement, and the ‘hybrid’ 
nature of some of its institutions – including but not limited 
to the institutionalisation of the ‘Guurti’ – underscores that 
Somaliland’s political evolution continues. Renders (2007) 
has described how the cooption of traditional leaders into 
formal legislative positions has changed their character, 
making them more remote from their erstwhile 
constituents.  
 
The close business-political links in the establishment of 
Somaliland has had far-reaching implications for political 
development. Phillips (2013) stresses linkages between 
key businesspeople (almost exclusively men) and the 
leading political figures in propping up the political 
settlement in exchange for effective monopoly positions in 
their sectors of interest, and the constraints that places on 
the market, and the emergence of strong service-delivery 
capacity from the state. Eubank (2012) examines the 
financial dependence of the Somaliland government on 
locally-derived taxes, as opposed to external aid or other 
forms of rental revenue, and argues that this was 
important to the high quality of governance. Lochery 
(2015) uses the case of the development of the electricity 
sector to examine the limits of the state’s ability to regulate 
the business sector, as it struggles to oversee the private 
sector players which had emerged to generate power 
following the collapse of the state. 
 
In our view, these explanations all warrant careful review 
as the environment changes rapidly. In particular, the 
period since 2012 has seen an increase in assistance to 
Somaliland, and most recently, the entry of significant 
investment and assistance from the Gulf States, as Dubai 
Ports World takes control of Berbera port, and the UAE 
establishes a military base nearby. The rents associated 
with control of major infrastructure (especially the port in 
Berbera and the airport in Hargeisa) have historically been 
important points of political contestation – even conflict, 
although Balthasar (2013) has highlighted how even such 
conflict was turned into an opportunity to strengthen the 
capacity of the nascent Somaliland state during the mid-
1990s – with a combination of political and national goals 
in mind, as then-President Egal was able to settle a political 
dispute with a rival and consolidate his own position and 
resource base, as well as the state itself. More recent 
negotiations for the Berbera port and base deals, which will 
reportedly involve more than US$400 million in investment 
in the port’s capacity, and unspecified rents for the base, 
have coincided with repeated delays to presidential and 
parliamentary elections. This presents a potentially 
striking contrast to previous experience, and raises 
interesting points of comparison with Somali politics 
elsewhere.   
 
Puntland  
 
A related issue is the extent to which Puntland can also be 
said to be an exception in terms of enduring political and 
economic stability, and the lessons that should be learned 
from this. The Puntland administration has just passed its 
nineteenth anniversary. Unlike Somaliland, Puntland’s 
leaders do not aspire to independence. Rather, Puntland 
remains part of the Somali political project, and its 
politicians have circulated between Puntland’s capital 
Garowe and Mogadishu, attempting to gain access at the 
national level when the opportunity arises. Puntland’s 
political project has also been informed by the experience 
of Somaliland, although it has followed a different 
trajectory (Crisis Group 2009). Hoehne (2009b) has 
explored the ways in which military conflict between 
Somaliland and Puntland over their border area has 
contributed to the development and consolidation of 
political identity. This dynamic has only been reinforced as 
the federal project has progressed since the adoption of a 
provisional constitution in 2012, and the formation of 
aspiring ‘federal member states’ during the 2012-17 
administration in Mogadishu. Territorial identity is 
emerging as a salient factor, in a shift from a more flexible 
role for territoriality in Somali social and political relations 
historically (Hoehne 2016), with Puntland’s experience a 
key example.  
 
In addition to the challenges of competing identities and 
territorial claims between Somaliland and Puntland, the 
government in Garowe has also faced a challenge on its 
southern border, as the aspiring Galmudug State 
administration has asserted territorial claims on all of the 
former Mudug province, which has been a fault-line since 
the 1990s. Galkayo, the key city in Northern Mudug, has 
been divided since the early 1990s, reflecting long-
standing differences in clan identity (which were 
recognised as far back as the colonial era), with Puntland 
administering the northern parts of the city, and asserting 
jurisdiction over northern Mudug (Yusuf and Khalif 2015). 
More recently, Puntland has also struggled for more than 
a decade with militancy in the Golis mountain area 
(Hoehne 2014), initially related to control over natural 
resources, but having become more entwined with 
Islamist militant networks. Puntland’s relatively coherent 
administration allowed it to sign exploration agreements 
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with wildcat oil exploration companies, while the 
transitional government in Mogadishu lacked the capacity 
to challenge that situation. Moreover, Puntland’s first 
president, Abdullahi Yusuf, was selected as the first 
president of the Transitional Federal Government from 
2004, limiting the national government’s interest in 
challenging Puntland’s position. As the transition waned, 
particularly from 2011, Puntland felt its position being 
challenged from Mogadishu, directly as the Galmudug 
administration took shape, but also indirectly as the 
federal institutions in Mogadishu sought to shape the 
member state formation process in southern Somalia, in 
Jubbaland in particular (Mosley 2015).  
 
Jubbaland and Elsewhere 
 
The experience in Jubbaland is particularly important to 
any assessment of the state-building exercise. It is an area 
of particular local complexity, with strong representation 
of militarised clan units that have historically been at odds 
with one another, and a large presence of minority groups. 
There has been a strong presence of Al-Shabaab until very 
recently. Different local elites have differing views on the 
balance between provincial and central power, and indeed 
some espouse a strong central state in contradiction to the 
federalism of the current constitution. Lastly, Jubbaland is 
also an area in which neighbouring states have powerful 
interests—primarily Kenya but also in the northern part, 
Ethiopia. For these reasons, Jubbaland is an important test 
case for the effectiveness of the various policy measures 
contained in the New Deal/Somali Compact. 
 
The Jubbaland experience is only recently becoming 
documented by researchers, most of them either 
connected to ongoing initiatives in the region, or engaged 
in the policy assessments (Mosley 2015; Crouch and 
Chevreux 2016; Allen and Gundel 2017). These provide 
important insights. They raise a host of questions. For 
example, is the devolution of power to provincial level a 
mechanism for engaging at the grassroots, or rather a 
means of empowering local elites, who may not be serving 
the interests of their constituents? Who among the local 
elites most supports this formula, and who is seeking 
further devolution or indeed centralisation? What is the role 
of financing (especially through ports)? What is the role of 
neighbouring countries in determining the viability of 
subnational governance units?  
 
The experience of other units such as Galmudug and the 
federal member states with only minimal governance 
structures, will be a subject of study as their 
administrations are gradually set up, depending on 
security circumstances. 
 
Ethiopia, Kenya and Djibouti 
 
There are substantial and influential Somali populations in 
neighbouring states. Ethiopia, Kenya and Djibouti have 
each taken different political, socio-cultural and economic 
approaches to the governance of their respective Somali 
communities. Consequently, the political economy of 
governance and the functioning of the political 
marketplace varies substantially. The Ethiopian Somali 
National Regional State administration has accumulated 
considerable economic and political power within 
Ethiopia’s federal system, and also exerts economic and 
security influence across the Somali and Somaliland 
border (Hagmann 2014). It offers a key comparison, and 
potentially a demonstration effect for the emerging federal 
member state administrations in Somalia. The Kenyan 
county administrations in Mandera, Garissa and Wajir – 
empowered politically and economically since 2013 by the 
introduction of devolution following constitutional reform 
– have also become important loci for political and 
economic competition, with dynamics that reach across 
the Somali border, including in security terms. This has 
echoed and reinforced existing dynamics observed by 
Menkhaus (2008), whereby locally rooted authority 
emerged in peacebuilding processes in the absence of a 
strong state presence. 
 
Such experiences are informative when considering the 
question of building local legitimacy, although conclusive 
analysis is lacking.  
 
Ethiopia’s federalisation process remains heavily 
centralised, but this has not prevented additional political 
settlements from emerging within regional 
administrations, including the Somali region. The 
emergence since 2012 of a consolidated form of authority 
within the administration of Ethiopian Somali National 
Regional State President Abdi Mohamoud Omar ‘Iley’ 
reveals another understudied political economy 
phenomenon. Abdi Iley’s administration has close links to 
the national military and the ruling coalition, without being 
a formal member of that group. The State was largely 
unaffected by the protest movement which swept 
neighboring Oromiya State during 2015-16. Nevertheless, 
there have been clashes between ethnic Somali and ethnic 
Oromo, including recent violence which has displaced tens 
of thousands. A paramilitary ‘liyu’ (‘special’) police force – 
comprised in part of former Ogaden National Liberation 
Front militants – played a key role in Abdi Iley’s political 
ascendance, and has reportedly been deployed across the 
international border into Somalia, as well as into Oromiya 
State in Ethiopia during unrest. 
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Kenya’s devolved institutions may have proved more 
locally legitimate than national elites envisioned (Chome 
2015; Cheeseman et al 2016). It is difficult to imagine 
Kenyans abandoning their new devolved political-
administrative system, as evidenced by a strong popular 
enthusiasm for county-level elections during 2017 
(Waddilove 2017).  
 
Devolved government in northeast Kenya is providing 
some important new data, which has yet to be deeply 
analysed in the existing literature, and so far has not been 
examined using the political marketplace as a framework. 
The development of county authority marks a major 
development in Kenyan sub-national politics. Although 
Kenyan elites initially calculated that the political centre of 
gravity would remain in Nairobi, events since 2013 have 
shown that the county level has become a key location for 
political competition, and provides significant access to 
resources – including the rents which fuel the political 
marketplace. This was reflected in the intensity of 
competition for gubernatorial seats during the 2017 
elections.  
 
Djibouti’s political economy resembles more the city-state 
models of the Gulf States and – to some degree – the 
historical experiences of Mogadishu and Bosaso as 
maritime garrison markets. Nevertheless, its successful 
management of an explicitly rentier economy, and its 
containment of a sizeable non-Somali minority political 
opposition – to the point where its military has been 
deployed within Somalia as part of AMISOM – will be seen 
by some as a potential model for balancing rents from 
multiple patrons (i.e. Ethiopia trade, Gulf State port 
investment, U.S. and French military facilities – being 
joined by Chinese and Saudi counterparts – and resupply 
arrangements for multiple international anti-piracy 
missions which use the country as a base. The dominance 
of a small clique around the ruling family echoes the Gulf 
States, although the country lacks the same natural 
resource endowments associated with the development 
and regional/international influence of those states. 
 
More broadly, the functioning of the political marketplace 
in these contexts will provide opportunities to analyse how 
Somalis appealing to moral populism – understood 
through identity politics in the Somali context: clan, religion 
– have established more or less sustainable forms of 
public authority. In the Kenyan and Ethiopian contexts, 
there will also be the opportunity to examine how in 
practice Somalis appeal to ‘civicness’ in social and political 
debates, and the degree to which civicness thus underpins 
(or does not) various forms of public authority.  
 
 
Nationalism, clan and ‘moral populism’ 
 
A strong theme in debates on Somalia’s crisis has been 
ethnicity, predominantly in the form of clan identity and 
conflict among lineage units. In earlier generations, 
Somalia was held up as the paradigmatic case of a country 
consisting of a single ethno-national group. There was a 
strong literature and thriving discussion on Somali 
nationality and how this related to the position of Somalis 
in neighbouring states (Djibouti, Ethiopia and Kenya) 
(Lewis 1983). This discussion has all-but-disappeared. 
However, pan-Somali nationalism remains an 
undercurrent in political debates, and occasionally comes 
to the fore. 
 
Somalia has over the last thirty years been described as 
riven by armed conflict among rival clans. This 
characterisation is marked by a generic use of the term 
‘clan’ to refer to many different levels of lineage-based 
organisation, from the level of ‘clan family’ (Darood, Diir, 
Hawiye, Isaak) through ‘clan’ (Majerteen, Ogadeen, Habr 
Gidir, Abgaal etc.) to ‘subclan’ and further subdivisions. 
Identity in Somalia is commonly presented as a primordial 
question—‘blood and bone’ (Lewis 1955, 1961, 1994)—and 
indeed the patrilineal naming system enables Somalis to 
place themselves within a remarkably unified national 
family tree. But the facility with which Somalis themselves 
use clan markers as identifiers conceals several important 
elements. 
 
First is the instrumental role of clan in military mobilisation, 
and the associated (and less remarked) flexibility and 
opportunism with which political-military entrepreneurs 
choose which clan identifiers to call upon, and which 
cross-clan alliances to make. It is a matter of circumstance 
whether a political leader chooses to identify himself as 
(for example) Hawiye, Habr Gidir, Ayr, or some other level 
of aggregation. Such a leader may also reach out to build 
temporary alliances with others. Tracing the military-
political alliances of any one individual across the years is 
likely to plot a highly changeable set of links. But there are 
very few such biographically-based studies. An 
illuminating exception is the biography of the erstwhile 
mayor of Mogadishu, Mohamed Nur ‘Tarzan’ (Harding 
2016). 
 
Also, the salience of identity markers depends on shared 
narratives and imaginings. Prominent among the latter are 
the traumas of the 1988-92 period. In Somaliland, the 
shared experience of massive targeted destruction was 
crucially important to the Somalilanders’ abandonment of 
the project of a shared Somali national identity, and the 
embrace of separatism (Bradbury 2008). In Mogadishu, 
the ‘clan cleansing’ that accompanied the overthrow of 
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Siyad Barre involved the wholesale removal of Darood clan 
members from the city (Kapteijns 2013). They fled en 
masse, subjected to horrendous violence, and abandoning 
their houses and property. This episode has defined a 
collective Darood political memory of the period, while the 
legacy of land seizures poses a significant material 
obstacle to the normalisation of political and social 
relations. On the side of the Hawiye clan family and 
especially the militia involved in the violations, this is an 
episode that is too often denied, and sometimes justified 
with reference to the abuses perpetrated by the Siyad 
Barre government, which the Hawiye identify with the 
Darood. In important ways, we can see the period of the 
civil war and the external peacemaking interventions that 
followed, as one in which clans were ‘created’ or ‘invented’ 
as political, military and administrative entities, carving out 
an arbitrary level of the segmentary lineage system to be 
the one that holds greatest socio-political significance. 
This has parallels to the ‘invention’ of tribalism elsewhere 
in colonial and post-colonial Africa. 
 
A particularly fascinating insight into the role of kinship 
during the dissolution of the state is provided by Anna 
Simons (1995), whose study shows the importance of 
personal networks in providing information, security, and 
material support as the structures of orderly governance 
collapsed. Kinship and clan were not only mechanisms for 
organising violence, but also for organising survival. The 
logic of clan identity is a useful means for relatively 
powerless constituents to invoke accountability from their 
leaders. 
 
Reversing the older literature that emphasised the ethnic 
uniformity of Somalia, there is also a growing focus on the 
minority communities in southern Somalia, including the 
minority clans (Rahanweyn and Digil-Mirifle) and the 
minority communities (Gabwing, Shebelle, Bantu, Banadir 
and others). This is tied in to a number of questions over 
land as well as identity and language (Besteman and 
Cassanelli 2003). 
 
Although overtaken by the push for federalism during the 
past fifteen years, Somali nationalism remains a potent 
force. This is a concern for neighbours with sizable Somali 
populations, especially Ethiopia, which still faces an active 
(if weak) militant opposition in its eastern region. Kenya’s 
northeast, where its Somali population is concentrated, 
has borne the brunt of instability spilling over from 
Somalia’s conflict, but has since Kenya’s 2011 military 
intervention in Somalia become a focus for militant activity 
linked to al-Shabaab political agenda. The continued 
political salience of Somali nationalism has recently been 
illustrated by the controversy over the transfer to Ethiopian 
authorities of Abdikarin Sheikh Muse ‘Qalbi Dhagah’, a 
deputy leader of the ONLF, by the government of President 
Mohamed Abdullahi ‘Farmaajo’. The handover of a Somali 
national, who happens to be a veteran of the 1977-78 war 
between Ethiopia and Somalia, has led to calls for 
Farmaajo’s resignation, and highlighted concerns over the 
influence of Somalia’s neighbours in its domestic affairs. 
The debate has also been instrumentalised by critics of 
federalism to attack the entire project as a proxy for the 
interests of external actors (especially Ethiopia). 
 
Somali nationalism has also played an important role in 
the political agenda of various militant actors in the 
context of the civil war during the last decade. This has 
been reflected, for example, in tensions within al-
Shabaab’s leadership over the group’s alignment with 
nationalist goals versus a global jihadist vision 
represented by their alignment with Al-Qaida. A nationalist 
call for the expulsion of foreign troops featured among al-
Shabaab’s most potent rallying calls when it launched its 
insurgency in 2007. 
 
The framework of ‘moral populism’ is a useful lens for 
understanding why the logic of clan identity is called upon, 
and for what reason, whether by political leaders or their 
ostensible followers. The interplay between the political 
market and identity politics promises to be a useful 
explanatory lens. This is particularly the case when we also 
consider the role of political Islam. 
 
Political Islam 
 
The role of political Islam and in particular the role of al-
Shabaab is a major concern for policymakers. Islamists 
have been a significant factor in the political economy of 
Somalia for decades. Somali Islamism has its unique 
characteristics in which business, social dynamics and 
political power intersect. Islamist politics also link Somalia 
to wider regional and global trends – both as a source of 
social and cultural exchange and as a perceived 
justification for external security intervention.  
 
Although understanding Islamism in Somalia is clearly a 
matter of the greatest policy relevance, this is not yet 
matched by a depth of scholarly analysis. There is a small 
literature on the early Islamic mobilisation in Somalia in the 
1990s (Marchal 2004) and on al-Qaida’s early and 
unsuccessful attempts to establish a presence in the 
country (de Waal 2004; Watts, Shapiro and Brown 2007). 
This is important in that it identifies the plurality of forms 
of political Islam in the country, and the difficulties that all 
of them had in gaining a strong foothold or a durable 
constituency. During the 1990s, Islamist movements – 
including militant groups such as Al-Itihaad Al-Islamiyya (a 
Somali movement) and al-Qaida – consistently 
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underestimated the difficulties of working in a situation of 
a collapsed state. For Islamist movements, the greatest 
progress was made in places of relative stability (such as 
Somaliland) and when they concentrated on social 
activities such as schools and on controlling mosques. 
The dominance of the traditional Sufi orders in the country 
has steadily been eroded by more conservative (often 
puritanical) Islamist movements, often backed by Gulf 
funds (Marchal 2013; Marchal and Sheikh 2015). These 
schools of thought are often referred to as Salafist or 
Wahhabist, although these terms have become imprecise 
in use, particularly in Western counter-terrorism or 
counter-extremism framings. Wahhabist in particular is 
not a term used by those to whom it is applied.  
 
Amid the convulsions of the early civil war period, provision 
of services – including local justice – gave such groups an 
inroad to social and eventually political influence 
(Anonymous 2010). They also made progress among 
minority groups with less political clout, such as in the 
upper Jubba valley and among the coastal communities. 
The Islamists were best able to make political progress 
when they clearly identified themselves as opposed to 
discredited warlords (notably in Mogadishu in 2005-06) 
but avoided direct confrontation with regional powers, 
against whom they could not stand. Since the late-2000s, 
conservative Islamist networks – ‘AlaSheikh’, ‘Damul 
Jadid’ – understood to be offshoots of the Somali Muslim 
brotherhood movement, Al-Islah, have had significant 
influence within the federal government, particularly within 
the presidency under Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed (2009-
12) and Hassan Sheikh Mohamud (2012-17) (Marchal 
2013). As noted in the ACTS report (Life and Peace 
Institute 2014), nearly every organised political movement 
in Somalia now defines itself in Islamic terms. This is a 
significant shift from (and rejection of) the secular, 
‘scientific socialism’ of the Barre regime during the 1970s 
and 1980s.   
 
The particular nexus of politics, business and security that 
brought about the rapid rise of the Islamic Courts Union in 
2006, has been studied (Barnes and Hassan 2007; Ahmad 
2017) but warrants further analysis. This is an episode that 
is not only of interest to historians. Although the ICU was 
militarily defeated and was politically disbanded, it remains 
and important point of reference for Somalis, including an 
enduring point of comparison against which the FGS and 
its record are judged. The ICU’s reputation for probity and 
fairness is probably not as well founded as the prevailing 
narrative would indicate, but the very fact that this story is 
still popularly resonant, is significant. Moreover, Ahmad’s 
analysis shows that there were some very specific 
commercial reasons for business support for the ICU, 
including lower and more predictable protection payments 
and checkpoint taxes, and reliable dispute resolution 
mechanisms. Businesses also found that once the ICU 
had established control over Mogadishu, the balance of 
power shifted and the Islamist authorities began to act 
against the commercial interests of their erstwhile 
sponsors. This experience has implications for current 
efforts to convince businesses to pay more taxes in 
exchange for services and security from the federal 
government (Randa et al 2017). 
 
The growth and agenda of al-Shabaab has been the focus 
of only a handful of empirically informed scholarly studies, 
which makes them more significant (Marchal 2009; 
Hoehne 2014; Hansen 2016; Chonka 2016). Roland 
Marchal brings to bear a deep understanding of the 
background and the personalities. He is impressed by the 
effective organisation and resilience of the organisation, 
which stands in marked contrast to the externally-backed 
governance regimes against which it stands. Al-Shabaab’s 
use of coercion has also proved more effective and 
disciplined than its adversaries. Stig Hansen provides a 
detailed history, with attention especially to the military 
dynamics. His framework of extremism and terrorism is 
more familiar to the policymaker, but resonates less with 
the shifting dynamics of Somalia. Markus Hoehne (2014) 
has examined militant Islamism in the Golis mountain 
region of Puntland, and sought to situate the militant 
movement within the clan-related competition for power in 
Puntland’s government, with Warsengeli militants being 
cast as Islamist/terrorists by the administration in Garowe. 
These dynamics are similar to those between al-Shabaab 
and the federal government. In reality, positions are more 
fluid, as demonstrated by defections of prominent Islamist 
figures from al-Shabaab or other groups during the past 
decade. A pair of studies (Marchal 2011; Chonka 2016) 
consider the dynamics of governance in areas under al-
Shabaab control, considering the group as a political 
organisation (rather than focusing on terrorist/extremist 
analytical framing). Chonka’s study looked at al-Shabaab’s 
discourses of development, while Marchal considered 
various practical aspects of municipal governance 
including policing, provision of justice and taxation. 
 
The dynamics of militant Islamism in Somalia are now a 
regional phenomenon, first in that al-Shabaab’s operations 
have affected neighbouring countries (most particularly 
Kenya) and second in that one of the organisation’s rallying 
cries has been opposition to the military operations of 
those neighbours inside Somalia. There has been analysis 
of the repercussions of the Ethiopian and Kenyan military 
interventions of 2006 and 2010 respectively (Hoehne 
2009a; Anderson and McKnight 2014), both of which 
conclude that the political objective of overcoming al-
Shabaab has become secondary to other goals, and may 
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therefore not be achieved. Some Somalis despaired that 
they would ever be allowed to solve their problems without 
destructive external interference (Samatar 2009). The 
problematic legal dimensions of the intervention have also 
been analysed (Yihdego 2007). 
 
The way in which Al-Qaida and al-Shabaab function is best 
explained through the related concepts of the political 
marketplace and moral populism. The al-Qaida documents 
analysed by Watts et al. (2007) show that financial 
considerations—both concerning the efficacy of financial 
governance and the strategy of buying support from local 
elites—were dominant in the organisation’s strategy for 
Somalia in the 1990s, and its failure. The analysis of the 
governance of al-Shabaab shows a similarly candid 
approach to calculating how to operate in a monetised 
political environment. As Aisha Ahmad writes, ‘From 
outside, these conflicts appear to be driven by ideas and 
identities; but inside these war zones, everyone is talking 
about money.’ (2017, p. 187) In parallel, both organisations 
have utilised moral populist scripts, associated with 
Islamism and nationalism, as a means of mobilisation. 
Materials in different languages are used strategically to 
appeal to different audiences using different, and often-
incompatible messages (Hansen 2016). 
The ‘Security Arena’ and SSR in Somalia 
 
The most demanding area for any form of state-building in 
Somalia is the security sector. A precondition for success 
in establishing a unified Somali security sector (however 
that may be defined) is that diverse external actors should 
share a common understanding of the task in hand. 
Unfortunately, this may not be possible when some 
external actors are involved partly to counteract the 
influence of other external actors. It is partly because of 
these sensitivities that reaching agreement on a security 
pact took several years longer than finalising the Somali 
Compact. 
 
An interesting example of significant investment in the 
Somali security sector is the Turkish construction of the 
new military academy (STRATFOR 2017), which is 
interpreted in part as a competition between Turkey and 
the UAE for influence. It is unlikely that Turkey, the UAE, 
and the African troop contributors to AMISOM, share the 
same diagnosis of the country’s security challenges. 
Somalia is heralded as the ‘winner’ in this competition, 
which is correct insofar as the country benefits from 
resource flows and a new military academy.   
 
The May 2017 London Conference laid out the basic 
framework of a Somali national security architecture 
(UNSOM 2017). The central vision is building a unified 
Somali National Army (SNA) and Somali National Security 
Forces (SNSF), which also includes police, coastguard, 
intelligence, etc. There are enormous technical issues in 
consolidating the national security architecture (DCAF 
2017), which include the proliferation of autonomous 
security actors, deficient and varying skills, training and 
equipment, corruption (including ghost soldiers on the 
payroll and procurement payoffs), transparency (with 
certain security institutions opaque even to the 
presidency) and standardising the training curricula 
among the numerous providers of technical assistance 
and training. There are also political challenges, notably 
negotiating the compromises for sharing power and 
responsibility between federal and state administrations. 
Lastly, of course, is the financial question: can Somalia 
afford the expense? (UNSOM and World Bank 2017). The 
May 2017 Political Agreement on the National Security 
Architecture specifies timelines for the various milestones 
including national financing to be achieved. As with the 
Somali Compact itself, this is more in the way of a 
foundational political agreement, than a fully-worked out 
plan. 
 
Fulfilling the promise of the Somali security compact and 
making the Somali national security architecture a reality 
on the ground, requires understanding the turbulent 
realities of the security arena including its multiple actors. 
All involved have a realistic appreciation of the scale of this 
challenge. The CRP intends to bring useful analytical tools 
to bear on this problem, grounded in a political 
marketplace analysis of the security landscape. 
 
Somalia is home to diverse security actors and armed 
groups. Until 2012, all were formally labeled as ‘non-state 
armed groups’, but this label concealed a wide diversity. 
Anthony Vinci (2006) identifies five different types of 
armed groups: faction, warlord, business, court and 
Islamic militias. But any kind of categorisation conceals 
commonalities among the groups, diversities within each 
category, and shape-shifting. Not only do the groups 
themselves morph, but individuals pursue career 
trajectories that move across different groups. The use of 
the label ‘terrorist’ for al-Shabaab serves as a political 
instrument (intended to ostracise and exclude the group—
just as its leaders’ own decision to affiliate with al-Qaeda 
was intended to debar political negotiations with others). 
‘Terrorist’ serves little analytical purpose. Writing before 
the designation of al-Shabaab as ‘terrorist’, Roland 
Marchal (2007) problematises the concepts of ‘warlord’ 
and ‘terrorist’. 
 
Alice Hills (2014a) prefers to avoid the term ‘security 
sector’ with reference to Somalia on the grounds that there 
is no unified sector and little institutionalisation. Rather, 
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she argues that multiple security actors operate in a 
dynamic arena, which entails continually negotiating their 
positions. She bases this on an analysis of three Somali 
regional police services. In another paper (Hills 2014b) she 
describes how regional police forces negotiate with 
external donors. In a third paper (Hills 2014c) she asks, 
‘what is policeness?’ as an explicit parallel to the idea 
(articulated by Lund 2006) of ‘stateness’ as consisting in 
an amalgam of local institutions of public authority linked 
to the idea of the state. In doing so, Hills intends to shift the 
focus from the institution to the context and function of 
those doing the policing. 
 
Will Reno (2017) explores how the term ‘security 
assemblage’ can be applied to Somalia. ‘Security 
assemblage’ implies that there is no fore-ordained or 
preferred structure to institutions and the linkages 
between them, but rather that multiple diverse kinds of 
entities exist and interact in different manners. It also does 
not presuppose a state-building agenda or trajectory: as 
Reno avers, it is not even clear that the SFG leadership 
actually wants to consolidate its authority over the security 
assemblages in the country—they may prefer the 
fragmented, rivalrous system that exists. In this regard, he 
observes that today’s political strategy is not 
fundamentally dissimilar to that of Siyad Barre’s last 
decade in power. Reno distinguishes two distinct kinds of 
private security firm. The first substitutes for the state, and 
notably includes foreign security companies, supported by 
business interests or foreign governments including the 
U.S. The other consists of alternative indigenous network, 
under the patronage of politicians. 
 
Bryden and Brickhill (2010) address the paradox that state-
building requires that the state disarm the citizenry, but the 
citizenry profoundly distrust the state—and with good 
historical reason. They write, ‘At the core of Somalia’s 
security dilemma lies a simple question: who is disarming 
whom?’ (p. 240). They provide an account of the effective 
DDR programme in Somaliland, which was based on 
consensus, incremental lesson-learning, and driven by 
local political demand, alongside an account of the less 
effective SSR/DDR in Puntland and disastrously ineffective 
efforts in south-central Somalia. Bryden and Brickhill 
conclude by observing that while security assistance post-
2007 has overshadowed all previous levels, the pattern of 
engagement is similar to the 1992-93 period, repeating the 
same mistakes. Though written before the establishment 
of the FGS, their analysis still resonates. It reminds us that 
although international state-builders tend to regard 
Somalia as a tabula rasa, the history of the state is vitally 
important. Robinson (2016) provides a historical account 
of the Somali armed forces since 1960. It is a 
straightforward chronicle without critical depth, but points 
to the need for more in-depth, reflective studies of this 
topic. 
 
A prominent issue in the literature since the early 2000s 
has been maritime piracy and the security of shipping. This 
is a priority question for international actors because of the 
high volume and value of international trade that passes 
near to the Somali peninsular. For our purposes, this issue 
will be addressed only insofar as it is relevant to the 
political economics of Somalia itself, which is a concern 
for only a small component of the literature on this topic 
(Dua and Menkhaus (2012). Stig Hansen (2012) provides 
an overview of the resurgence of piracy since the mid-
2000s, observing that maritime pirates were entirely 
separate from, and shunned by political actors, with some 
exceptions after 2010. Roland Marchal (2011) focuses on 
the local moral economy of piracy, which has been 
neglected by analyses that frame the problem as one of 
state collapse. Weldemichael (2014) describes how the 
negotiation and payment of ransoms has undermined 
local communities. 
 
Counter-piracy has served as an entry point for private 
security companies, funded by shipping corporations or 
foreign governments, to provide high-end security services 
to Somali authorities at a sub-national level. Hansen 
(2009) observes that this has served the purpose of 
strengthening state-like authority in these areas. Kinsey, 
Hansen and Franklin (2009) provide an overview of the 
nature of these companies. Gilmer (2017) details how the 
process of imprisoning suspected and convicted pirates in 
East African countries has created a market in prison 
services and the prisoners themselves. 
 
Peace Operations and the Security Sector 
 
AMISOM plays a central role in Somalia’s security sector. 
It is a unique peace support operation in that it is principally 
a counter-insurgency operation undertaken by a regional 
coalition of the willing, under the flag of the AU and with 
the kinds of technical and financial support that the UN 
and EU normally would provide only to a peacekeeping 
operation (Williams 2013, 2016, 2017). AMISOM is large 
and expensive. It is politically and financially sustainable 
only on the assumption that it will draw down over the 
coming years (AU 2017). Evaluations of AMISOM have 
mostly focused on technical aspects, on the assumption 
of continued progress in its military mission (ISS 2016, 
2017). The overall assessment of AMISOM’s military 
operations is that it is gaining ground against Al-Shabaab, 
but the metrics for assessing progress are problematic 
and seasoned observers note that driving Al-Shabaab from 
holding territory does not readily translate into destroying 
it as an irregular force or a political actor (Bryden 2014; 
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Menkhaus 2014c; Anderson 2016). Analysts have noted 
the weakness of AMISOM’s civilian component both in 
numbers and strategy. Protection of civilians was only 
inserted into AMISOM’s mandate in 2013, but it is hard to 
see how an offensive military operation could undertake 
the kinds of PoC activities that are standard procedure for 
a UN multi-dimensional peacekeeping operation under 
‘Chapter VI-and-a-half’ (Fitz Gerald 2017). AMISOM units 
are known to have been involved in violence against 
civilians including violations of international humanitarian 
law, and even smuggling (Journalists for Justice 2015). 
 
The military backbone of AMISOM is the deployments by 
the ‘frontline states’ Ethiopia and Kenya into areas of 
operation that coincide with those countries’ security 
perimeters. This is a departure from the standard practice 
of peace support operations (Berhe and de Waal 2017; Fitz 
Gerald 2017). It is only such frontline states with 
substantial national security interests in Somalia that 
would be prepared to sustain the heavy human cost of the 
offensive military operations that AMISOM has conducted. 
This, however, comes at the expense of neutrality. The 
perceived lack of neutrality of the African troops has 
legitimised the involvement of other international security 
providers from the Middle East, including Turkey, the UAE, 
Egypt and Sudan. Meanwhile private security contractors 
have been involved in internal security provision (for 
training the SNSF, protecting embassies and businesses, 
and for maritime security), supported by external partners, 
and the U.S. has been mounting its own counter-terrorist 
special operations and supporting the Somali national 
intelligence and security service, at times bypassing all the 
Somali authorities.  
 
The stated intent of AMISOM is to build ‘a well-motivated 
and truly national army and police whose allegiance is to 
country and not to any particular clan or region’ (Sidikou 
2015). However, as Wondemagegnehu and Kebede (2017) 
point out, ‘Multiple external training providers have failed 
to coordinate both their efforts and the content of the 
instruction they provide to the SNSF, which presents 
further roadblocks to creating viable national security 
institutions in Somalia. This is noted by one AMISOM 
official, who states that ‘while everyone talks of 
coordination in Somalia, nobody wants to be coordinated’ 
(p. 213). The different troop contributing countries to 
AMISOM deploy in their own separate theatres of 
operation (in the case of Ethiopia and Kenya, in the areas 
close to their own borders which are important to their own 
national security), and train and equip their counterpart 
Somali contingents according to their own practices and 
doctrines. The resulting SNA units are thus unified in name 
only: there is no inter-operability or unity of command, 
control, training or doctrine. Other external security actors 
in Mogadishu (Turkey, the U.S., the UN etc.) have different 
approaches again. Somalis are well aware of this wide-
open field of competition and the ensuing market in the 
services of ‘violent labour’ (Al-Bulushi 2014). 
 
The approaches to disarmament also differ across 
AMISOM sectors. While there are some efforts at the 
reintegration of former al-Shabaab combatants through 
the UN (Ubink 2017), there are also parallel exercises in 
redistributing arms and creating new local militia to serve 
as auxillaries for AMISOM and the SNA. 
Natural Resource Management and the 
Business Sector 
 
The fact that state collapse did not entail economic 
collapse has not gone unremarked. The dynamism of 
Somalia’s telecoms and financial sectors, and—less 
consistently—its livestock exports, has been the subject of 
a small but fascinating literature, and one of the narratives 
of contemporary Somalia, which may be caricatured as 
‘better off stateless’ (Leeson 2007). The reality of the 
difficulty in operating affected by violence and predation – 
both from informal banditry or extortion at ad hoc check 
points, and in the form of protection rackets by warlords or 
other militant movements (and sometimes both) – has 
been vividly described in Ahmad’s (2017) account of the 
business sector and its intersection with political Islam, 
and underscore the trade-offs involved for business (small 
and large) when the state cannot guarantee security.  
 
Nevertheless, one of the most positive aspects of Somalia 
in the 1990s and early 2000s was economic dynamism. 
Freed of the shackles of an interfering and acquisitive 
state, the Somali business class functioned efficiently. The 
livestock export trade rebounded rapidly and, also 
benefiting from open access to the Somali Region in 
Ethiopia, grew to surpass the levels it had attained before 
(Little 2003; Mahmoud 2010; Majid 2010; Hagmann and 
Stepputat 2016).  
 
By 2012, diaspora remittances were estimated to be at 
least $1.2 billion annually to Somalia and Somaliland, 
amounting to as much as half of GDP, and making it one 
of the most remittance-dependent countries in the world 
(Hammond 2013). According to the UK Somali 
remittances survey, an estimated 40% of Somali 
households, and more in urban areas, receive money from 
the diaspora. About 14% of remitted funds are invested, 
financing 80% of business start-ups (Hassan and 
Chalmers 2008, p. 13). However, there are some 
indications that remittances may have passed their peak, 
as younger Somalis in the diaspora feel less bound by ties 
to their relatives back home, and less obliged to send 
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financial support to them. Remittances have also faced 
challenges more recently from financial regulation, as 
money transfer operators struggled to find viable banking 
services in the United States and United Kingdom 
following changes in banking regulations meant to tackle 
money laundering and counter terrorist financing (Lindley 
and Mosley 2014). On the other hand, there has been a 
significant increase in appetite for investment in 
Mogadishu since 2011, with a sense of growing 
opportunities in the city’s reconstruction on the back of the 
international intervention to support the SFG and combat 
al-Shabaab. This in part explains the appeal of pursuing 
government office for the diaspora, as a preamble to 
business ventures. Similar dynamics have followed the 
development of member state projects, especially in 
Kismayo and Baidoa. In all cases, investment has had 
important implications for land markets (see below). 
 
Somalia’s financial sector has emerged in response to the 
inability of the established banking and financial transfer 
systems to function in the Somali setting, and the modus 
operandi of businesses such as Dahabshiil reflects the 
specific strengths of Somali society, for example the fact 
that anonymity or disguised identity is impossible (Collins 
2009a, 2009b). The largest Somali finance houses, notably 
Hormuud, have moved into the provision of mobile money 
and are de facto acting as the country’s banks. The main 
players in finance are also active in other sectors; most 
have roots as trading companies – usually with bases in 
the Gulf States – that built on their import-export capacity 
to begin offering money transfer services through 
traditional hawala systems, and then expanded and 
formalised these operations into larger-scale operations 
with global reach, and more recently, into retail and 
commercial banking. Links to other sectors, including the 
built retail environment, transportation and – importantly 
– telecommunications, have enabled the main players to 
consolidate significant positions in the political economy. 
This is perhaps better studied in the Somaliland context 
(Iazzolino 2016), but similar dynamics obtain in 
Mogadishu and other parts of southern and central 
Somalia. Indeed, these dynamics have intensified since 
2012, when the Federal Government of Somalia was 
formally recognised by many governments and began 
rebuilding its relationships with the international financial 
system. A private sector bank, Premier, has emerged using 
a Somali SWIFT code, including branches in Somaliland. 
Other financial institutions (including Dahabshiil and Dar 
es Salaam banks in Somaliland) have had to route 
transactions through Djibouti or the United Arab Emirates, 
the latter being an important clearing house for money 
transfer operators (Lindley and Mosley 2014). 
 
Somalia also developed first-rate telecommunications as 
well as private airlines and hotels. Businessmen 
established their own regulatory systems and law and 
order mechanisms, beginning in the major market centres 
such as Berbera in Somaliland and Bokara market in 
Mogadishu. In 2004, Somali businessmen opened a Coca 
Cola plant in Mogadishu with investment of $8.3 million. 
On both income and human development indicators, 
Somalia has done better since 1991 than before (Powell, 
Ford and Nowrasteh 2006; Leeson 2007). This is a 
remarkable testament to the capacity of the Somali 
business class to use globalisation—the diaspora, trade, 
and self-regulation—to the benefit of the population. 
Indeed, Somalia is one of the most extensive instances of 
contemporary globalisation (Leonard and Ramsey 2013). 
 
However, these positive developments should be seen 
alongside some equally striking failures. For example, at 
US$1/KWh, Somalia’s electricity is the most expensive in 
the world (USAID 2014). 
 
The business sector cannot be analysed outside its 
political context and its political influence, including the 
rivalries among businessmen, contests over control over 
key assets such as land (rural and especially urban) and 
infrastructure (roads and ports), and associated payments 
to politicians (Phillips 2013). The ‘better off stateless’ 
narrative celebrates the dynamism of the private sector 
without paying due heed to these kinds of rivalries and the 
associated ruthless business practices.  
 
The business sector is also closely integrated into the 
security sector, funding both private security companies 
and clan-based militia (LeSage 2002; Webersik 2006; 
Hansen 2009; Ahmad 2017; Reno 2017). The business 
sector was deeply involved in the setting up of the Islamic 
Courts Union and its associated courts militia, which 
briefly governed Mogadishu and much of south-central 
Somalia in 2006 (Ahmad 2017). Donors, spearheaded by 
the UN Mission (UNSOM), have advocated for a 
strengthening of business support for the federal 
government through taxation. Hagmann and Stepputat 
(2016, pp. 23-25) provide a useful overview of the literature 
on the ambivalent posture of businesses towards the state 
in Somalia (and Somaliland). Although insecurity is bad for 
small and large businesses, and while businesses have 
clearly aligned themselves with state-building projects 
(Phillips 2016; Ahmad 2017) – perhaps most visibly in the 
Arta process, the rise of the ICU and the elite bargain 
underpinning the political settlement in Hargeisa – they 
have been reluctant to empower the state lest its power to 
regulate and tax be strengthened to their detriment. For 
example, Dahabshiil is understood to have worked to 
stymie passage of a commercial banking law in 
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Somaliland.4 Even amid the 2016-17 food security crisis 
affecting Somalia and Somaliland, businesses have 
engaged only cautiously with the idea of a state-led or 
coordinated relief approach, preferring to focus on their 
own philanthropic initiatives. Ahmad’s (2017) analysis of 
the role of businesses in fueling the Islamic Court Union’s 
rise suggests strongly that cutting operational costs was 
their prevailing concern, rather than being driven by any 
ideological position. Nevertheless, once in the ascendant, 
the Courts were able to dictate the terms of their financial 
relationship with the business sector, including large 
businesses (Ahmad 2017, especially Chapter 5).  
 
The business sector is also linked strongly to wider 
regional dynamics. Many businesses operate across 
Eastern Africa (Hagmann and Stepputat 2016; Carrier and 
Lochery 2013), as displacement from the late 1980s 
reinforced older patterns of population distribution, and 
Somali businesspeople began taking advantage of 
opportunities across the region. This included capital 
investment, import-export and of course the livestock 
sector. However, even beyond Eastern Africa, Somali 
businesses have strong links to the Gulf States. Many of 
the large conglomerates which now operate across the 
finance, telecommunications and real estate sectors 
began operations as trading companies with bases in 
Dubai. These bases facilitated the emergence of the 
money transfer services which underpinned the 
development of Somali’s current banking and finance 
systems. The UAE remains an important hub for Somali 
business (see Horn of Africa-Red Sea synthesis paper). 
 
Land and Real Estate 
 
In the 1990s, the struggle for land was described as ‘the 
war behind the war’ (Besteman and Cassanelli 2003). The 
farming peoples of the Jubba and Shebelle valleys, coming 
mainly from ‘minority’ or indigenous clans or the Gosha 
(the so-called ‘Somali Bantu’), occupied the most fertile 
and valuable agricultural land in the country. They were 
subject to several waves of dispossession: during the 
colonial era for plantation farming, during the Siyad Barre 
era by well-connected businessmen, government officials 
and army officers for land speculation and commercial 
agriculture (Besteman 1999), and during the wars of 1991-
93 by the victorious ‘liberators’ of the anti-Barre forces, as 
land looting. Land dispossession occurred in multiple 
forms at different levels. 
 
Urban land was also violently seized, especially during the 
wars of 1990-92, notably in Mogadishu (Kapteijns 2013). 
The capital was ‘clan cleansed’ of Darood during this 
                                                     
4 Mosley interviews in Hargeisa, January-February 2017. 
period. Other cities, including Kismayo, were also disrupted 
and large-scale real estate seizures took place. With 
subsequent conflicts, and more particularly with economic 
development that followed political stability, urban real 
estate has taken on enormous value compared to earlier. 
However the history of land seizures and the many cases 
in which land has been inherited, divided, leased or sold, 
without a sovereign authority to authenticate the 
transactions, has led to an extraordinarily complex 
problem of contested land ownership in the cities. 
Disputes are significant not only to the concerned parties, 
but also at a broader, political level. As tensions peaked 
during early 2013 between the federal government in 
Mogadishu and the emerging Jubbaland regional 
administration in Kismayo over who should be driving the 
member state formation process (federal institutions or 
local politicians), rhetoric referenced the displacement of 
the 1990s, with Jubbaland politicians demanding land in 
Mogadishu be restored to the ‘Darood’ if the ‘Hawiye’ 
(widely seen to dominate Mogadishu’s economy, and 
having held the federal presidency since 2009) wanted a 
say in Kismayo’s politics (Mosley 2015). 
 
In Mogadishu the issues are the most complicated and 
salient (Rift Valley Institute 2017) and have the greatest 
potential to cause political dispute, commercial and 
economic disruption, and even insecurity. Nevertheless, in 
other regions, particularly port cities that have seen 
significant investment during the last five years (including 
Mogadishu, but also Kismayo, Bosaso and especially 
Berbera), as well as Hargeisa, which has grown 
significantly in the last decade, competition for land and 
speculative investment in real estate raises the potential 
for disputes. This issue has not been adequately 
researched, with important exceptions such as the Rift 
Valley Institute study noted above. Still less have 
processes of dispute resolution, such as the courts, been 
studied. This is a crucial question for the future stability 
and development of Somalia. 
 
Business-government relations 
 
Under the New Deal/Somali Compact (2013) framework, 
the (Western) donor community is investing significantly in 
expanding the capacity and legitimacy of the federal 
government and its institutions. Underpinning this 
intervention is the assumption that the government can 
boost its legitimacy by delivering services to the population 
in areas under its authority, and that moreover, this should 
take place within a framework of downward accountability, 
reinforced as the government funds its services from 
domestic taxation and revenue generation (Randa et al 
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2017; IMF 2017; Hearn and Zimmerman 2014; UNSOM 
2014; and Federal Government of Somalia 2013). 
Nevertheless, the federal government’s regulatory and 
taxation powers remain constrained. Revenues appear to 
be mainly generated through tariffs on the movement of 
goods (i.e. import duty and port fees) and on transaction 
taxes where these can be enforced, for example on market 
traders for access to stalls, or on hotel tariffs in Mogadishu 
(IMF 2017; Randa et al 2017).  
 
As described above, the relationship between business 
and government in Somalia has largely been antagonistic 
or predatory. Since 1991, businesses have largely resisted 
attempts to empower government over them, leading to 
fairly stable but limited government in Hargeisa, for 
example (Phillips 2013), or producing unexpected or 
contradictory outcomes, as in the case of the Transitional 
National Government produced by the Arta Process or the 
subsequent emergence of the Islamic Courts Union 
(Ahmad 2017). The degree to which the business sector 
has moved on in its approach to relations with central 
authority (or even local authority) presents an important 
line of inquiry. Business still provides much of the funding 
for the political marketplace. Where more durable forms of 
public authority have emerged, research can illuminate 
how sustainable relations with the business community 
have been established, and what prospect there exists for 
a more assertive role for those authorities in extracting 
revenues sustainably from business. 
Community Level Dialogue and Mediation 
 
There is a remarkable history of peacemaking efforts in 
Somalia since the late 1980s. The Life and Peace Institute 
states baldly: 
 
Almost all established peacebuilding and conflict 
resolution approaches have been attempted in 
Somalia over the last two decades: a number of 
military interventions (by the U.S., UN, regional 
armies, African Union), numerous international and 
regional mediation efforts, bottom-up peacebuilding 
based on Somali customary approaches, national 
clan-based peacebuilding as well as all sorts of 
mixed approaches applying national, international 
and local efforts in parallel. All these approaches to 
peacebuilding and state-building have failed to 
establish security and peace in Somalia. (Life and 
Peace Institute 2014, p. 10) 
 
However, other analyses present a more nuanced picture. 
For example, Mark Bradbury for Interpeace writes: 
 
In a country which has become a by-word for 
seemingly endless political disorder and 
humanitarian crises, an analysis of ‘peace dynamics’ 
rather than ‘conflict dynamics’ reveals a society 
adapting to state collapse, managing conflict, and 
establishing systems of governance. The Somali 
region is not simply a lawless and ungoverned land 
but one where communities have forged a variety of 
systems to provide security and law and order and to 
facilitate economic activity. This study has recorded 
90 local peace meetings in south and central Somalia 
alone since 1991. As such, the study provides an 
alternative history of the Somali region for the past 
two decades. (Bradbury 2009, p. 9) 
 
The Interpeace peace mapping study, led by Bradbury, is a 
comparative study of Somali-managed peace meetings 
and internationally sponsored and mediated reconciliation 
conferences concerned with ‘national’ or ‘state-level’ 
governance and regional and international security. Its 
main concern is with social and traditional actors rather 
than those actors that serve as brokers with foreign 
donors (e.g. NGOs). The study finds that traditional conflict 
management is generally oriented towards restoring and 
sustaining social relations, while internationally led 
processes are focused on restoring state institutions. 
Local initiatives work in specific contexts, and do not either 
apply universal templates or seek replicability elsewhere. 
They are slow, inclusive, work through consensus, and do 
not claim to address underlying root causes. Bradbury 
writes: 
 
Traditional Somalia approaches to peacemaking tend 
to be process rather than product oriented. Somali 
peace processes are, therefore, invariably long-drawn 
out, often lasting several months [or even] over a year. 
All the Somali-led conferences examined in this study 
were a culmination of several smaller, more localised 
meetings. The final peace conference and the accord 
did not themselves produce the peace; such meetings 
are rarely able to address ‘underlying causes’. It is, 
therefore, the process leading to the conference at 
which agreements and consensus are forged - and the 
implementation of the peace accord - that is important 
(p. 50) 
 
None of the findings are strictly generalizable, because 
there are many agreements that fail, or achieve only limited 
success. Inclusion is respected more in rhetoric and 
aspiration than in formal participation (especially the 
participation of women). 
 
A finding of particular note in the review is that local 
funding of peace initiatives facilitates local buy-in. 
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Bradbury writes, ‘All the local processes studied were 
predominantly - but not exclusively - locally financed, with 
communities raising both cash and goods-in-kind. The 
investment by people in a process is one measure of their 
commitment to it, although it can also highlight partial 
interests in a particular outcome.’ (p. 55) 
 
The distinction between international and local peace 
efforts is not as clear-cut as might be imagined. Traditional 
initiatives have often prospered because of a context 
provided by an international effort, and international peace 
processes have also become co-opted into local political 
processes. The government of Djibouti, sponsor of several 
peace conferences, is itself a culturally Somali political 
actor, and a broker between local and international 
processes. 
 
There are several studies that explore the views of Somali 
political actors, e.g. by the Life and Peace Institute (2014) 
and Saferworld (Crouch and Chevreux 2016). (The latter is 
specifically focused on Jubaland.) Having criticised 
existing approaches for being dominated by exclusion and 
a counter-terror agenda, these studies ask political actors 
what they see as the key issues, how those issues should 
be addressed, and what they would like Somalia to look 
like. They take pains to include actors that have been 
marginalised or excluded, including al-Shabaab. However, 
in the nature of opinion surveys (albeit conducted through 
semi-structured interviews), these studies are framed 
around certain questions, which are those of the state-
building and power-sharing agendas, and the actors’ 
hopes and expectations for what a future Somali national 
state should resemble. As such they do not consider the 
calculations and processes that would be foregrounded in 
a political market analysis. 
 
There are excellent, detailed and often critical accounts of 
the various national peace processes since the 1990s 
(Interpeace 2009). For an overview of the Djibouti process 
see Kasaija (2012). However, there are as yet no insider 
accounts of the negotiations based on documented 
source material. This is a significant gap. 
Humanitarian Crisis and Humanitarian Action  
 
Somalia suffered famine in 1991-92 and 2011-12 and, in 
2017, suffered a severe humanitarian emergency that 
analysts warned may have descended into famine without 
external support. There is a considerable literature on this. 
The 1991-92 famine is outlined and analysed by de Waal 
(1997). The predominant concern of the academic and 
policy literature is the effectiveness and limitations of the 
early warning system (Lautze et al. 2012; Hobbs et al. 
2012; Hillbruner and Moloney 2012; Mosley 2012; Bailey 
2013), humanitarian access (Menkhaus 2010; Hammond 
and Vaughan-Lee 2012), and the challenges of dealing with 
al-Shabaab (Program on Humanitarian Policy and Conflict 
Research 2011; Jackson and Aynte 2013). Francesco 
Checchi (2013) is the leading authority on mortality in the 
famine. The most comprehensive account of the 2011-12 
famine, covering all of these topics and some more as well, 
is Maxwell and Majid (2016).  
 
Taking the three humanitarian emergencies/famines 
together we can identify the following causes and 
contributors, observing that in each case, a coincidence of 
several factors was needed in order to create a famine.  
 
A striking feature of Somalia’s three famines is that they all 
struck hardest in the same area, which also happens to be 
the most fertile part of the country, namely the Jubba and 
Shebelle river valleys and the lands in between. These are 
areas inhabited by the minority clans and other riverian 
peoples of south-central Somalia, who have long been 
marginalised and subjected to forcible land alienation. 
 
In two of the three cases, environmental decay and 
exposure to climatic shocks was a factor. In 2011 and 
2017, climatic oscillations associated with el Niño/la Niña 
were major contributors to harvest failure and shortages 
of grazing for livestock. 
 
In 2011, an important factor in the famine was exposure to 
an external economic shock, in the form of the second 
wave of the ‘global food crisis’. As a country heavily 
dependent on imported food and with its markets well 
integrated into global food markets, the food price hike of 
late 2010 and early 2011 hit the country hard. Lacking a 
government that can design and implement policies such 
as grain market interventions to mitigate global price 
movements, Somalis were particularly vulnerable. 
However, it should also be noted that the first wave of the 
global food crisis in 2008, did not have this impact. 
 
In the 1992 and 2011 crises, the single greatest contributor 
to successful coping by the affected populations, was the 
size and effectiveness of social networks. Those who had 
large and widely-spread networks, and who were able to 
migrate purposefully or call upon family members in the 
diaspora, were far better placed to cope. Those without 
were much less able to do so. Maxwell and Majid conclude 
their analysis by noting, ‘Ultimately, the difference between 
being able to cope in extreme circumstances and not being 
able to cope came down to the issue of social 
connectedness.’ (pp. 114-5) 
 
The 1992 famine was very largely caused by armed 
conflict, looting and the associated destruction of 
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livelihoods, displacement, and restrictions on commercial 
activities including the importation of food. These features 
recurred in 2011 and 2017 but in a more localised manner. 
Thus, while armed conflict is closely associated with food 
security crisis, it would be more generally accurate to 
conclude that it is one factor among several that leads to 
starvation. A significant factor is the degree to which 
national and local governance actors are involved in 
planning for emergencies, if they even have the capacity to 
do so; this was a key difference between the Kenyan and 
Ethiopian experiences of the 2011 drought and that in 
Somalia (Mosley 2012).  
 
In the 2011 and 2017 crises, coercion and corruption in 
governance systems was also a culprit. Al-Shabaab 
imposes taxes, penalties and restrictions on the 
populations under its control. Maxwell and Majid write, 
‘The Transitional Federal Government was peripherally 
involved in the response to the famine but this was more 
dependent on the goodwill and initiative of certain 
individuals rather than policy, and some government 
employees were actively competing to influence the 
direction of aid or attempting to profit from it.’ (p. 110). 
They note that about half of food aid went astray because 
of influence of businessmen, NGO leaders, government 
officials and militia leaders. Some incidents of diversion 
were linked to al-Shabaab, contributing to the U.S. decision 
to cut back on aid. 
 
Turning to the issues relevant to the humanitarian 
response to the crisis, the lessons of the 1992 famine are 
less relevant after 25 years, but those from the 2011 crisis 
are highly pertinent to the current situation. The Maxwell 
and Majid (2016) study identifies the critical role of local 
‘first responders’ and social networks in providing modest 
but timely assistance. A related factor is the leading role of 
the business community in providing assistance—a topic 
that has been hardly studied.  
 
The international humanitarian system forecast the crisis 
in an accurate and timely manner. The information 
provided by FEWSNET and the Integrated Food Security 
Phase Classification (IPC) system was good. The problem 
lay entirely in the response. A notable constraint upon 
international humanitarian action was imposed by 
counter-terrorist legislation, notably the U.S. Patriot Act, 
which was crucially important in driving the U.S. decision 
to cut back on food assistance to Somalia as the crisis 
began to develop. Despite the efforts of both domestic U.S. 
actors (within the government and in the NGO sector) and 
international actors, the U.S. decision to find a workaround 
for the Patriot Act came very late in the day (Hammond 
and Vaughan-Lee 2012). 
 
Finally, the Somalia famine of 2011 is notable for the role 
played by new humanitarian actors such as Turkey, the 
Gulf States and Islamic humanitarian agencies. These new 
agencies are widely distrusted by the major established 
donors and international NGOs, which have a ‘guilty until 
proven innocent’ approach (Maxwell and Majid 2016, p. 
178). They have different modes of working, including 
focusing on providing assistance during Ramadhan and 
the Eid, giving food items regarded as luxuries by western 
agencies, but which are in high demand for these festivals. 
Interestingly, the Islamic agencies have no better record in 
getting access to al-Shabaab areas.  
 
A particular gap in the study of the humanitarian response 
has been the role of Somali humanitarian and civil society 
actors, and how they are able to operate under the very 
difficult circumstances they face. 
Gender dynamics in Somali settings 
 
Gender has been an important theme throughout Somali 
history, and often linked to conflict and contestation. In the 
mid-1970s, the Barre regime promoted a secular, anti-
‘clannist’ developmental agenda, including the legislation 
of changes to family law affecting women’s rights to own 
and inherit property, which shifted away from the various 
versions of Somali customary law or Sharia’a 
jurisprudence. Education was expanded and literacy 
improved, for men and women. Since the outbreak of the 
civil war, analysis of the gendered dimensions of politics, 
conflict and humanitarian issues in Somalia has tended to 
focus on the disproportionate impacts on women of 
conflict and insecurity, both physical and socioeconomic 
(Abdi 2011). However, given the protracted nature of 
Somalia’s political crisis, and the geographical variation in 
conditions of insecurity between the relatively stable 
Somaliland and Puntland towards the less settled parts of 
southern and central Somalia, there has also been a 
chance to analyse the role of women in various Somali 
peacemaking efforts – particularly in the north (Gardner 
and El Bushra 2004). Processes of dispute resolution and 
larger settlements have gendered dimensions, as these 
involve elders and respected Islamic scholars, both roles 
traditionally held by men. Women’s roles are often seen as 
indirect (Walls 2014), through influence over their spouses 
or children.  
 
During the 2002-04 talks which produced the Transitional 
Federal Institutions, the ‘sixth clan’ movement sought to 
secure a structured position for women in governance. 
Sixth clan is a reference to the 4.5 clan quota system, 
wherein each of the four major clans (Darood, Hawiye, Dir 
and Digil-Mirifle) is given an equal share of representation 
in national institutions, with a half-share allocated to the 
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‘minority clans’. Although quotas for women have been 
part of the provisional constitution since 2012, as the seat 
quotas are distributed, clan elders have consistently 
proved reluctant to allocate their seats to female 
candidates (Ingiriis and Hoehne 2013). However, women 
have been taking more prominent roles in frontline politics, 
including senior positions in the various federal cabinets 
(Hammond 2013a). 
 
The Women Peace and Security (WPS) agenda has framed 
much international intervention in Somalia over the last 
two decades, in promotion of gender equality in post-
conflict settings – mainly through efforts which target 
formal institutions. The WPS agenda rests of the 
assumption that more participation by women and 
movement towards gender equality will support peace and 
security in post-conflict reconstruction. Horst (2017) 
examines the lived experience of Somali women of 
political participation, and relates this to the normative 
agenda behind WPS. In resonance with many aspects of 
international intervention in Somalia, Horst finds that the 
WPS agenda fails to take local realities into account, 
particularly local understandings of ‘gender equality’ and 
‘inclusion’ (p. 391). This failure leaves the WPS agenda 
struggling to find purchase within a framework of ‘norm 
diffusion’, which posits a transfer of norms from the 
‘international’ to the ‘local’. Horst’s research also 
illuminates the range of perspectives held, including by 
those in Somali settings who have links to or have lived 
abroad, including in liberal societies, but who might not 
share the normative assumptions underpinning the WPS 
agenda.   
 
Other literature also seeks to challenge stereotypes of 
women as passive victims and/or peacemakers. Indeed, in 
addition to the ‘sixth clan’ movement, Ingiriis and Hoehne 
(2013) describe women’s engagement as combatants and 
in exhorting their clan’s militia fighters to action. Women 
can also occupy important positions in clan relations, as 
members of one clan by birth and (often) another by 
marriage, sometimes allowing them to play a role as 
interlocutors. In addition, as Gardner and El Bushra (2015) 
explore in their important study of the impact of war on 
masculinity, in conditions of displacement women – who 
are often specifically targeted for humanitarian or 
development assistance – may often replace men as the 
main source of household income, by pursuing economic 
activities (such as petty trading) which are not considered 
gender appropriate for men. This can result in economic 
emasculation (loss of raganimo, the Somali concept of 
masculinity). For men, this can have knock on effects on 
social mobility, particularly the question of becoming a 
respected contributor to community debates, and 
potentially an elder (Gardner and El Bushra 2015).  
 
A final area of interest for our agenda is the question of 
gendered dimensions of access to justice. Already in 
customary law, as well as in Islamic jurisprudence, women 
and men have different recourse to justice. Schlee (2013) 
notes that while customary institutions have been hailed 
as providing stability in Somalia, in practice, the experience 
of justice is uneven. This has clan dimensions as well as 
gendered dimensions, with larger or more powerful clans 
more likely to be able to impose a more favourable 
resolution through such institutions. Allen et al (2016) 
assess the range of challenges facing Somalia’s formal 
judicial institutions, in terms of being able to deliver access 
to justice for most citizens, and at the local level, due to 
bureaucratic incapacity and, more significantly, rampant 
corruption. In a case focused on Dhobley town in Afmadow 
district of Lower Juba, from which al-Shabaab was 
expelled in 2012, Allen et al note the challenges of access 
to and availability of local, formal justice institutions. 
Similar to Schlee (2013), they also find that access is 
affected by factors such as clan and wealth, with wealthier 
individuals and those from more power clans better 
positioned to seek justice. Gender will be an important 
aspect of our inquiry into land-related disputes.  
 
 
 
  
25          Somalia Synthesis Paper, 2017  
Bibliography 
 
Abdi, Cawo M., 2011. A Gendered Perspective on the 
Impact of Conflict in the Horn of Africa. Uppsala: 
Nordiska Afrikainstitutet. http://www.diva-
portal.org/smash/get/diva2:417848/FULLTEXT
01.pdf, accessed 25 July 2017. 
Ahmad, Aisha, 2017. Jihad & Co. Black Markets and 
Islamist Power. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Al-Bulushi, Samar, 2014. ‘“Peacekeeping” as Occupation: 
Managing the market for violent labor in Somalia,’ 
Transforming Anthropology, 22.1, 31-37. 
African Union, 2017. “Report on the Ten-Year AMISOM 
Lessons-Learned Conference,” African Union 
Peace Support Operations Division, 9-10 March 
2017. Accessed online at: 
http://www.accord.org.za/publication/report-
ten-year-amisom-lessons-learned-conference/ 
Allen, S. and Gundel, J. 2017. Enhancing districtlevel 
governance & accountability in Somalia: The 
citizen-directed negotiated accountability project. 
Nairobi: IAAAP. 
Allen, Sean, Hawo Idris and Tanja Chopra, 2016. 
“Women’s Access to Justice and Security in 
Somalia’s Afmadow District: A Snapshot.” UN 
Women Briefing Paper 1/2016. 
http://katuni.net/wp-
content/uploads/2016/12/Briefing_paper_1_Jus
tice_Security.pdf, accessed 25 July 2017. 
Anderson, David and Jacob McKnight, 2014. ‘Kenya at 
War: Al-Shabaab and its enemies in eastern 
Africa,’ African Affairs, 114/454, 1–27. 
Anderson, Noel, 2016. ‘Why Victories in Battle Have Not Yet 
Finished the War Against al-Shabaab, Survival,’ 
58:4, 51-62, DOI: 
10.1080/00396338.2016.1207947. 
Anonymous, 2010. “Islam and Somali social order,” in Sally 
Healy and Mark Bradbury (eds), Whose Peace is 
it anyway? Connecting Somali and international 
peacemaking. ACCORD, 21, London: Conciliation 
Resources, pp 94-97.  
Bailey, Rob, 2013.  Managing Famine Risk: Linking Early 
Warning to Early Action. London, Chatham 
House. 
https://www.chathamhouse.org/publications/p
apers/view/190589, accessed 26 June 2017. 
Balthasar, D., 2013. “Somaliland’s best kept secret: shrewd 
politics and war projects as means of state-
making,” Journal of Eastern African Studies, 7.2, 
218-238. 
Balthasar, D., 2014. Oil in Somalia: Adding Fuel to the Fire? 
Mogadishu: Heritage Institute for Policy Studies. 
http://www.heritageinstitute.org/wp-
content/uploads/2014/06/HIPS-Oil_in_Somalia-
ENGLISH.pdf, accessed 15 September 2017. 
Barnes, Cedric and Harun Hassan, 2007. “The Rise and Fall 
of Mogadishu’s Islamic Courts,” Journal of 
Eastern African Studies, 1,2: 151-160. DOI 
10.1080/17531050701452382 
Berhe, Mulugeta Gebrehiwot and Alex de Waal, 2017. 
‘Peace Missions and the Security Sector in 
Africa.’ African Security Review, 26.2, 113-115. 
Besteman, Catherine and Lee Cassanelli, 2003. The 
Struggle for Land in Southern Somalia: The war 
behind the war, London, Haan. 
Besteman, Catherine, 1999. Unraveling Somalia: Race, 
Class and the Legacy of Slavery. Philadelphia, 
University of Pennsylvania Press.  
Botha, Anneli, and Mahdi Abdile, 2014. "Radicalisation and 
al-Shabaab recruitment in Somalia." Institute for 
Security Studies. 
https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploa
ds/Paper266.pdf. 
Bradbury, Mark and Sally Healy (eds.) 2010. ‘Whose Peace 
is it Anyway? Connecting Somali and 
International Peacemaking, London, Conciliation 
Resources,’ http://www.c-r.org/our-
work/accord/somalia/conclusions.php 
Bradbury, Mark, 2009. ‘The Search for Peace: A synthesis 
report of the peace mapping study,’ Geneva, 
Interpeace. 
Bradbury, Mark, 2008. Becoming Somaliland. Oxford, 
James Currey. 
Brickhill, Jeremy, 2010. “Security and Stabilization in 
Somalia: Learning from local approaches,” in 
Mark Bradbury and Sally Healy (eds.) ‘Whose 
Peace is it Anyway? Connecting Somali and 
International Peacemaking,’ London, Conciliation 
Resources, 2010, http://www.c-r.org/our-
work/accord/somalia/conclusions.php 
Bryden, Matt. 1999. ‘New hope for Somalia? The building 
block approach.’ Review of African Political 
Economy 26 (79): 134–41. 
Bryden, Matt, 2014. The Reinvention of Al-Shabaab: A 
Strategy of Choice or Necessity? Report. Center 
for Strategic & International Studies. https://csis-
26          Somalia Synthesis Paper, 2017  
prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-
public/legacy_files/files/publication/140221_Bry
den_ ReinventionOfAlShabaab_Web.pdf. 
Bryden, Matt, and Jeremy Brickhill, 2010. ‘Disarming 
Somalia: Lessons in stabilization from a 
collapsed state.’ Conflict, Security and 
Development, 10.2, 239-262. 
Carrier, Neil and Emma Lochery, 2013. ‘Missing states? 
Somali trade networks and the Eastleigh 
transformation’, Journal of Eastern African 
Studies, 7(2): 334-352. DOI: 
10.1080/17531055.2013.776275 
Checchi, Francesco, 2013. ‘Mortality among populations of 
southern and central Somalia affected by severe 
food insecurity and famine during 2010-2012,’ 
Rome, FAO and FEWSNET. 
Cheeseman, Nic, Gabrielle Lynch and Justin Willis, 2016. 
‘Decentralisation in Kenya: the governance of 
governors’. Journal of Modern African Studies, 
54(1): 1-35. DOI: 10.1017/S0022278X1500097X 
Chome, Ngala, 2015. “‘Devolution is only for development’? 
Decentralization and elite vulnerability on the 
Kenyan coast”. Critical African Studies, 7(3): 299-
316. DOI: 10.1080/21681392.2015.1075750 
Chonka, Peter, 2016. “Spies, stonework, and the suuq: 
Somali nationalism and the narrative politics of 
pro-Harakat Al Shabaab Al Mujaahidiin online 
propaganda,” Journal of Eastern African Studies, 
10.2: 247-265. DOI 
10.1080/17531055.2016.1180825 
Collins, Gregory, 2009a. “Connected: Exploring the 
Extraordinary Demand for Telecoms Services in 
Post‐collapse Somalia,” Mobilities 4.2, 203–223. 
Collins, Gregory, 2009b. “Connected: Developing Somalia’s 
Telecoms Industry in the Wake of State Collapse,” 
PhD Thesis, University of California Davis. 
Compagnon, Daniel, 2013. “State-sponsored violence and 
conflict under Mahamed Siyad Barre: the 
emergence of path dependent patterns of 
violence,” Reinventing Peace, 
http://sites.tufts.edu/reinventingpeace/2013/10
/22/state-sponsored-violence-and-conflict-
under-mahamed-siyad-barre-the-emergence-of-
path-dependent-patterns-of-violence/, 22 
October  
Coolidge, Jacqueline and Susan Rose-Ackerman, 1997. 
“High-Level Rent-Seeking and Corruption in 
African Regimes,” Washington DC, World Bank, 
Private Sector Development Department and 
Foreign Investment Advisory Service, Policy 
Research Working Paper 1780, June. 
Crouch, Joanne, and Oliver Chevreau, 2016. ‘Forging 
Jubaland: Community perspectives on 
federalism, governance and reconciliation.’ 
London, Saferworld. 
De Waal, Alex, 1997. Famine Crimes: Politics and the 
disaster relief industry in Africa, London, James 
Currey. 
De Waal, Alex, 2004. ‘The politics of destabilization in the 
Horn, 1989-2001,’ In Alex de Waal (ed.) Islamism 
and Iits Enemies in the Horn of Africa, London, 
Hurst. 
De Waal, Alex, 2015. The real politics of the Horn of Africa: 
Money, War and the Business of Power, Mass.: 
Polity Press  
De Waal, Alex, 2017. ‘Theorising (Dis)order: Exploratory 
Remarks,’ Reinventing Peace, 14 March, 
http://sites.tufts.edu/reinventingpeace/2017/03
/14/theorizing-disorder-exploratory-remarks/ 
Dua, Jatin and Ken Menkhaus, 2012, The Context of 
Contemporary Piracy: the Case of Somalia, 
Journal of International Criminal Justice, Volume 
10, Issue 4, 1 September 2012, 749-766 
Eubank, Nicholas, 2012. ‘Taxation, Political Accountability 
and Foreign Aid: Lessons from Somaliland,’ 
Journal of Development Studies, 48:4, 465-480 
Federal Republic of Somalia, 2013. The Somali Compact. 
Fitz-Gerald, Ann. 2017. ‘Towards a common doctrine for 
African Standby Force-led peace operations,’ 
International Peacekeeping, 24:4, 616-638, DOI: 
10.1080/13533312.2017.1345313 
Gardner, Judith and Judy El Bushra (eds), 2004. Somalia: 
The Untold Story, The War Through the Eyes of 
Somali Women. London: Pluto Press. 
Gardner, Judith and Judy El-Bushra, 2015. “The Impact of 
War on Somali Men: An Inception Study.” LOGiCa 
Study Series and Rift Valley Institute Research 
Project. May 2015.  
Gilmer, Brittany V, 2017, Somali Piracy Prisoners and 
Biopolitical Penal Aid in East Africa, Punishment 
& Society, Vol. 19 (1), 151-131  
Gundel, J. and Allen, S.  2017. Civil society and civic 
engagement in accountability in Somalia. Nairobi: 
IAAAP. 
Hagmann, Tobias, 2014. Talking Peace in the Ogaden: The 
search for an end to conflict in the Somali 
Regional State in Ethiopia. London/Nairobi: Rift 
Valley Institute.  
27          Somalia Synthesis Paper, 2017  
Hagmann, Tobias, 2016. Stabilization, Extraversion and 
Political Settlements in Somalia. London/Nairobi: 
Rift Valley Institute.  
Hagmann, Tobias & Hoehne, Markus V. 2009.  “Failures of 
the State Failure Debate : evidence from the 
Somali territories”. Journal of International 
Development, Vol. 21, No. 1, 42-57. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/jid.1482  
Hagmann, Tobias & Finn Stepputat, 2016. Corridors of 
trade and power: economy and state formation in 
Somali East Africa. GOVSEA Paper Series. 
Copenhagen: DIIS. 
Hammond, Laura and Hannah Vaughan-Lee, 2012. 
Humanitarian space in Somalia: a scare 
commodity. HPG Working Paper. April. London: 
ODI. 
https://www.odi.org/sites/odi.org.uk/files/odi-
assets/publications-opinion-files/7646.pdf, 
accessed 26 June 2017. 
Hammond, Laura, 2013a. “Somalia Rising: Things are 
Starting to Change for the World’s Longest Failed 
State,” Journal of Eastern African Studies, 7, 1, 
183-193. DOI 10.1080/17531055.2012.755316  
Hammond, Laura. 2013b. Family Ties: Remittances and 
Livelihoods in Puntland and Somaliland. Nairobi, 
Food Security and Nutrition Analysis Unit 
(FSNAU) Somalia.  
Hansen, S. J. (2009) Piracy in the Greater Gulf of Aden: 
Myths, Misconceptions and Remedies, Norwegian 
Institute for Urban and Rural Research (NIBR)  
Hansen, Stig Jarle, 2016. Al-Shabaab in Somalia: The 
history and ideology of a militant Islamist group. 
Oxford, Oxford University Press. 
Harding, Andrew, 2016. The Mayor of Mogadishu: A story 
of chaos and redemption in the ruins of Somalia, 
London, Hurst. 
Hassan, Mohamed Aden and Caitlin Chalmers, 2008. “UK 
Somali Remittances Survey,” London, DFID and 
sendmoneyhome.org, May, 
http://www.diaspora-
centre.org/DOCS/UK_Somali_Remittan.pdf 
Healy, S., 2011. “Hostage to Conflict: Prospects for 
Building Regional Economic Cooperation in the 
Horn of Africa,” London: Chatham House. 
https://www.chathamhouse.org/publications/p
apers/view/179951, accessed 26 June 2017. 
Hearn, Sarah, 2016. “Independent Review of the New Deal 
for Engagement in Fragile States for the 
International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and 
Statebuilding,” New York: Center on International 
Cooperation, New York University. 
Hearn, Sarah and Thomas Zimmerman, 2014. A New Deal 
for Somalia? The Somali Compact and its 
Implications for Peacebuilding. New York: Center 
on International Cooperation, New York 
University. 
Hesse, B.J., 2010. "Introduction: The myth of ‘Somalia’". 
Journal of Contemporary African Studies. Vol. 28, 
Iss. 3, 247-259. 
Hillbruner, Chris, and Graine Moloney, 2012. ‘When early 
warning is not enough—Lessons learned from 
the 2011 Somalia Famine,’ Global Food Security, 
1, 20-28. 
Hills, Alice, 2014a. ‘Security Sector or Security Arena? The 
evidence from Somalia,’ International 
Peacekeeping, 21.2, 165-180. 
Hills, Alice, 2014b. ‘Somalia Works: Police development as 
statebuilding’, African Affairs, 113/450, 88-107. 
Hills, Alice, 2014c. ‘What is Policeness? On Being Police in 
Somalia’, The British Journal of Criminology, 
Volume 54, Issue 5, 1 September; 765-783.  
Hobbs, Christina, Mark Gordon and Brian Bogart, 2012, 
‘When business is not as usual: Decision-making 
and the humanitarian response to the famine in 
South Central Somalia,’ Global Food Security, 1, 
50-56. 
Hoehne, M.V., 2006. “Political Identity, Emerging State 
Structures and Conflict in Northern Somalia,” 
Journal of Modern African Studies, 44.3, 397-414. 
Hoehne, M.V., 2009a. ‘Counter-terrorism in Somalia, or: 
how external interferences helped to produce 
militant Islamism,’ Social Science Research 
Council webforum, ‘Crisis in the Horn of Africa,’ 
http://hornofafrica.ssrc.org/somalia/  
Hoehne, M.V., 2009b. “Mimesis and Mimicry in Dynamics 
of State and Identity Formation in Northern 
Somalia,” Africa, 79.2, 252-281. 
Hoehne, M.V., 2014. “Resource conflict and militant 
Islamism in the Golis Mountains in northern 
Somalia (2006–2013),” Review of African Political 
Economy, 41.141, 358-373. DOI: 
10.1080/03056244.2014.901945. 
Hoehne, M.V., 2016. “The Rupture of Territoriality and the 
Diminishing Relevance of Cross-cutting Ties in 
Somalia after 1990”. Development and Change, 
47.6, 1379–1411. DOI:10.1111/dech.12277 
28          Somalia Synthesis Paper, 2017  
Hooley, Ted, Siafa Hage, George Ingram, and Jacob 
Hughes, 2014. “Implementing the New Deal for 
Fragile States,” The Brookings Institution. 
Horst, Cindy, 2017. “Implementing the Women, Peace and 
Security agenda? Somali debates on women’s 
public roles and political participation,” Journal of 
Eastern African Studies, 11, 3, 389-407. DOI 
10.1080/17531055.2017.1348000 
Iazzolino, Gianluca, 2016. Following Mobile Money in 
Somaliland. Nairobi, Rift Valley Institute. 
http://riftvalley.net/publication/following-mobile-
money-somaliland, accessed 26 June 2017. 
ICAI, 2017. UK aid in a conflict-affected country: Reducing 
conflict and fragility in Somalia. London: The 
Independent Commission for Aid Impact. 
http://icai.independent.gov.uk/wp-
content/uploads/EMBARGOED-Reducing-
conflict-and-fragility-in-Somalia-ICAI-review.pdf, 
accessed 15 September 2017. 
Ingiriis, Mohamed H. and Markus V. Hoehne, 2013. “The 
impact of civil war and state collapse on the roles 
of Somali women: a blessing in disguise,” Journal 
of Eastern African Studies, 7, 2, 314-333. DOI 
10.1080/17531055.2013.776281 
International Crisis Group (ICG), 2008. “Somalia: To Move 
Beyond the Failed State,” Brussels, ICG Africa 
Report No. 147, December. 
International Crisis Group (2009) ‘Somalia: The Trouble 
with Puntland’, Africa Briefing No 64, Nairobi/Brussels. 
International Monetary Fund (IMF), 2017. Somalia: Second 
and Final Review under the Staff–Monitored 
Program and Request for a New Staff–Monitored 
Program. IMF Country Report No. 17/204, 
Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund. 
https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/CR/Issues
/2017/07/11/Somalia-Second-and-Final-Review-
Under-the-Staff-Monitored-Program-and-
Request-for-a-New-45065, accessed 15 
September 2017. 
Interpeace and Centre for Research and Dialogue, 2009. A 
History of Mediation in Somalia since 1988. 
Geneva, Interpeace. 
Institute for Security Studies, 2016. “Can AMISOM exit 
Somalia responsibly by 2020?” Peace and 
Security Council Report. 24 August 2016. 
Accessed online at: 
https://issafrica.org/pscreport/situation-
analysis/can-amisom-exit-somalia-responsibly-
by-2020 
Institute for Security Studies, 2017. “The PSC agrees on a 
cautious exit strategy for AMISOM,” Peace and 
Security Council Report. 29 September 2017. 
Accessed online at: 
https://issafrica.org/pscreport/on-the-
agenda/the-psc-agrees-on-a-cautious-exit-
strategy-for-amisom 
DCAF. 2017. International Security Sector Advisory Team: 
Somalia SSR Background Note. July 19. 
Accessed September 26, 2017. 
http://issat.dcaf.ch/Learn/Resource-
Library/Country-Profiles/Somalia-SSR-
Background-Note 
Jackson, Ashley, and Abdi Aynte, 2013. ‘Talking to the 
other side: Humanitarian negotiations with Al-
Shabaab in Somalia,’ London, ODI, HPG Working 
Paper, December. 
Jamal, Vali, 1988. “Somalia: Understanding an 
unconventional economy,” Development and 
Change, 19, 203-65. 
Journalists for Justice, Black and White: Kenya’s Criminal 
Racket in Somalia, Nairobi, November 2015, 
http://www.jfjustice.net/userfiles/file/Research/
Black%20and%20White%20Kenya%27s%20Crim
inal%20Racket%20in%20Somalia.pdf 
Kapteijns, Lidwien, 2013. Clan Cleansing: The ruinous 
legacy of 1991. Philadelphia: Univ. of 
Pennsylvania Press. 
Kasaija, Apuuli Phillip, 2010. ‘The UN-led Djibouti peace 
process for Somalia 2008–2009: Results and 
problems’, Journal of Contemporary African 
Studies, 28:3  
Kinsey, Christopher Paul, Stig Jarle Hansen and George 
Franklin, 2009. ‘The Impact of private security companies 
on Somalia’s governance networks,’ Cambridge Review of 
International Affairs, 22.1, 147-161. 
Lacey, Marc “Amid Somalia’s Troubles, Coca Cola Hangs 
on,” New York Times, 10 July 2006. 
Lautze, Sue, Winnie Bell, Luca Alinova and Luca Rosso, 
2012. ‘Early warning, late response (again): The 
2011 famine in Somalia,’ Global Food Security, 1, 
43-49. 
Leeson, Peter, 2007. “Better Off Stateless: Somalia before 
and after government collapse,” Journal of 
Comparative Economics 35.4, 689-710 
Leonard, Emma and Gilbert Ramsey (eds.) 2013. 
Globalizing Somalia: Multilateral, international and 
transnational repercussions of conflict. NY: 
Bloomsbury. 
LeSage, Andre, 2002. ‘Somalia: Sovereign disguise for a 
Mogadishu Mafia’, Review of African Political 
Economy, 29:91, 132-138. DOI: 
10.1080/03056240208704593 
29          Somalia Synthesis Paper, 2017  
Lewis, Ioan (ed.), 1983. Nationalism and Self-Determination 
in the Horn of Africa, Exeter, Ithaca. 
Lewis, Ioan, 1955. Peoples of the Horn of Africa: Somali, 
Afar and Saho. London, International African 
Institute. 
Lewis, Ioan, 1961. A Pastoral Democracy: A study of 
pastoralism and politics among the northern 
Somali of the Horn of Africa, London, International 
African Institute. 
Lewis, Ioan, 1994. Blood and Bone: The call of kinship in 
Somali society. Trenton NJ, Red Sea Press. 
Life and Peace Institute, 2014. ‘Alternatives for Conflict 
Transformation in Somalia: A snapshot and 
analysis of key political actors’ views and 
strategies.’ Uppsala, Life and Peace Institute. 
Lindley, Anna and Jason Mosley, 2014. “Challenges for 
the Somali money transfer sector,” Nairobi, Rift 
Valley Institute. 
http://riftvalley.net/publication/challenges-
somali-money-transfer-sector, accessed 26 
June 2017. 
Little, Peter. 2003. Somalia: Economy without State. Oxford, 
James Currey. 
Lochery, Emma, 2015. Generating Power: Electricity 
provision and state formation in Somaliland. 
Unpublished doctoral thesis. University of Oxford. 
Lund, Christian, 2006. ‘Twilight Institutions: Public 
authority and local politics in Africa,’ Development 
and Change, 37.4, 685-705. 
Mahmoud, Hussein, 2010. ‘Livestock Trade in the Kenyan, 
Somali and Ethiopian Borderlands,’ Chatham 
House briefing paper. 
Majid, Nisar, 2010. ‘Livestock Trade in the Djibouti, Somali 
and Ethiopian Borderlands,’ Chatham House 
briefing paper. 
Marchal, Roland and Zakaria M. Sheikh, 2015. “Salafism in 
Somalia: Coping with Coercion, Civil War and its 
Own Contradictions,” Islamic Africa, 6: 135-163. 
DOI 10.1163/21540993-00602004 
Marchal, Roland, 2004. ‘Islamic political dynamics in the 
Somali civil war,’ In Alex de Waal (ed.) Islamism 
and Iits Enemies in the Horn of Africa, London, 
Hurst. 
Marchal, R. (2007) ‘Warlordism and terrorism: how to 
obscure an already confusing crisis? The case of 
Somalia’, International Affairs, 83 (6): 1091-1106.  
 
Marchal, Roland, 2009. ‘A tentative assessment of the 
Somali Harakat Al-Shabaab’, Journal of Eastern 
African Studies, 3:3, 381-404 
Marchal, Roland, 2011. “The rise of a Jihadi Movement in 
a country at war: Harakat al-Shabaab al-
Mujaheddin,” Nairobi/Paris, report 
commissioned by the FCO. 
http://www.sciencespo.fr/ceri/sites/sciencespo.
fr.ceri/files/art_RM2.pdf, accessed 26 June 
2017.  
Marchal, Roland. and Zakaria Sheikh. “Ahlu Sunna wa I-
Jama’a in Somalia”, in Muslim Ethiopia: The 
Christian Legacy, Identity Politics and Islamic 
Reformism 215-240, Desplat Patrick and Ostebo, 
Terje (eds.), NY: Palgrave Macmillan.  
Maxwell, Daniel, and Nisar Majid, 2016, Famine in Somalia: 
Competing Imperatives, Collective Failures, 
2011-12, London: Hurst 
Menkhaus, K., 2008. “The rise of a mediated state in 
northern Kenya: the Wajir story and its 
implications for state-building,” Afrika Focus, 
21.2, 23-38. 
Menkhaus, Ken, 2007. ‘The Crisis in Somalia: Tragedy in 
five acts,’ African Affairs, 106/204, 357–390. 
Menkhaus, Ken, 2010. ‘Stabilisation and humanitarian 
access in a collapsed state: the Somali case.’ 
Disasters, 34. doi:10.1111/j.0361-
3666.2010.01204.x 
Menkhaus, K., 2014a. “State Failure, State-Building, and 
Prospects for a ‘Functional Failed State’ in 
Somalia.” ANNALS, AAPSS, 656, November, 154-
172. DOI: 10.1177/0002716214547002 
Menkhaus, K., 2014b. “If Mayors Ruled Somalia: Beyond 
the State-building Impasse,” Policy Note 2, 
Nordic Africa Institute. 
http://nai.uu.se/news/articles/2014/04/29/1543
51/index.xml, accessed 26 June 2017.   
Menkhaus, Ken, 2014c. ‘Calm between the storms? 
Patterns of political violence in Somalia, 1950–
1980’. Journal of Eastern African Studies, 8(4): 
558-572. DOI: 10.1080/17531055.2014.949404 
Menkhaus, Ken, 2014d. ‘Al-Shabab's Capabilities Post-
Westgate.’ CTC Sentinel 7, no. 2 (February 2014): 
4-8. https://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/al-
shababs-capabilities-post-westgate 
Mosley, Jason, 2012. Translating Famine Early Warning 
into Early Action: An East Africa Case Study. 
London, Chatham House. 
https://www.chathamhouse.org/publications/p
apers/view/187205, accessed 26 June 2017. 
30          Somalia Synthesis Paper, 2017  
Mosley, Jason, 2015. Somalia’s Federal Future: Layered 
Agendas, Risks and Opportunities. London: 
Chatham House. 
https://www.chathamhouse.org/publication/so
malias-federal-future-layered-agendas-risks-and-
opportunities, accessed 24 Jun 2017. 
Mosley, Jason, 2016. ‘Ethiopian Politics Beyond the 
Vanguard?’ Expert Comment, Chatham House, 
October 18. 
https://www.chathamhouse.org/expert/comme
nt/ethiopian-politics-beyond-vanguard, accessed 
20 September 2017. 
Pham, J.P. 2011, ‘Somalia: Where a State is not a State’, 
The Fletcher Forum of World Affairs, Vol. 35. 
http://www.fletcherforum.org/home/2016/9/6/
somalia-where-a-state-isnt-a-state, accessed 24 
June 2017. 
Phillips, S. 2013. “Political Settlements and State 
Formation: The Case of Somaliland,” Research 
Paper 23, Developmental Leadership Program. 
December. 
http://www.dlprog.org/publications/political-
settlements-and-state-formation-the-case-of-
somaliland.php, accessed 26 June 2017. 
Phillips, S., 2016. “When less was more: external 
assistance and the political settlement in 
Somaliland,” International Affairs, 92.3, 629–645. 
Powell, Benjamin, Ryan Ford and Alex Nowrasteh, 2006. 
“Somalia After State Collapse: Chaos or 
Improvement?” Oakland CA, Independent 
Institute Working Paper No. 64, 30 November, 
http://www.independent.org/pdf/working_paper
s/64_somalia.pdf 
Program on Humanitarian Policy and Conflict Research, 
2011. ‘Countering Terror in Humanitarian Crises: 
The Challenges of Delivering Aid to Somalia,’ 
Harvard, PHPCR. 
Raeymaekers, T., K. Menkhaus, & K. Vlassenroot, 2008. 
“State and non-state regulation in African 
protracted crises: governance without 
government?” Afrika Focus, 21.2, 7-21. 
Randa, John, Catherine Mwende Ngumbau, Kevin Carey, 
Abdulqafar Abdullahi, Aues Scek, Barbara Karni, 
and Janerose Muboka Lubisia, 2017. Somalia 
economic update: mobilizing domestic revenue to 
rebuild Somalia. Somalia economic update; no. 2. 
Washington, DC: World Bank Group. 
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/55
2691501679650925/Somalia-economic-update-
mobilizing-domestic-revenue-to-rebuild-Somalia, 
accessed 15 September 2017 
Raven-Roberts, Angela, 2013. “Women and the Political 
Economy of War,” in Carol Cohn (ed.) Women and 
Wars, Cambridge: Polity Press, 36-53. 
Renders, Marleen. 2007. “Appropriate ‘Governance-
technology’?: Somali Clan Elders and Institutions 
in the Making of the ‘Republic of 
Somaliland’.” Afrika Spectrum 42 (3): 439–459 
Reno, William, 2017. ‘Failed, Weak or Fake State? The role 
of private security in Somalia,’ in Paul Higate and 
Mats Utas (eds.), Private Security in Africa: From 
the global assemblage to the everyday. London, 
Zed. 
Rift Valley Institute, 2017. Land Matters in Mogadishu: 
Settlement, ownership and displacement in a 
contested city. Nairobi, RVI. 
Robinson, Colin, 2016. ‘Revisiting the Rise and Fall of the 
Somali Armed Forces, 1960-2012.’ Defense and 
Security Analysis, 32.3, 237-252. 
Samatar, Said, 2009. “America, Pray Leave Somalia to its 
Own Devices”, Journal of Contemporary African 
Studies, 28.3 July. 313-323 
Schlee, Günther, 2013. “Customary law and the joys of 
statelessness: idealised traditions versus Somali 
realities,” Journal of Eastern African Studies, 7, 2, 
258-271. DOI 10.1080/17531055.2013.776276 
Sidikou, Maman.  “Securing Stability in Somalia: AMISOM’s 
Evolving Role and Regional Implications.” 
London: Chatham House, April 2015 
https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/files/chat
hamhouse/field/field_document/15%2004%200
1%20AMISOM%20QA_checked.pdf: 
Simons, Anna, 1995. Networks of Dissolution: Somalia 
undone, Boulder CO: Westview. 
STRATFOR, 2017. ‘In the race between Turkey and UAE, 
Somalia wins,’ 14 August, 
https://worldview.stratfor.com/article/race-
between-turkey-and-uae-somalia-wins 
UNOSOM II, undated. “Background”, 
http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/
past/unosom2backgr1.html, accessed 24 
January 2017 
United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM), 
2014. United Nations Somalia Integrated 
Strategic Framework: 2014-2016. 
https://unsom.unmissions.org/integrated-
strategic-framework-somalia-2014-2016, 
accessed 25 September 2017. 
31          Somalia Synthesis Paper, 2017  
United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM), 
2017. Somalia Security Pact, London, 
https://unsom.unmissions.org/sites/default/file
s/london-somalia-conference-2017-security-
pact.pdf.pdf 
United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia and the 
World Bank (2017) Somalia Security and Justice 
Public Expenditure Review, 
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/64
4671486531571103/pdf/Somalia-SJPER-
01302017-Final-Version.pdf 
USAID, 2014. ‘Somalia Economic Growth Strategic 
Assessment,’ Washington DC, July. 
Waddilove, Hannah, 2017. 'Kenya voted for change and 
got it…at the local level'. African Arguments, 
August 18. 
http://africanarguments.org/2017/08/18/kenya-
voted-for-change-and-got-it-at-the-local-level-
elections/, accessed 20 August 2017. 
Walls, M., 2014. A Somali Nation-State: History, Culture and 
Somaliland’s Political Transition. Ponte-Invisbile: 
Pisa, Italy. 
Warah, Rasna, 2012. “New Report Reveals Somalia's 
Missing Millions,” Foreign Policy in Focus, 31 
July, 
http://www.fpif.org/articles/new_report_reveals
_somalias_missing_millions accessed 20 
September 2014. 
Watts, Clint, Jacob Shapiro and Vahid Brown, 2007. Al-
Qaida’s (Mis)adventures in the Horn of Africa, 
West Point, Harmony Project. 
Webersik, Christian, 2006. “Mogadishu: an economy 
without a state,” Third World Quarterly, 27, 8: 
1463-1480.  
Weldemichael, Awet, T. (2014). “Ransoming in 
Contemporary North East Africa: Piracy off the 
Coast of Somalia”, African Economic History, Vol. 
42, 215-237.  
Williams, Paul. 2013. ‘Somalia.’ In Jane Boulden (ed.) 
Responding to Conflict in Africa: United Nations 
and Regional Organizations, New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan 
Williams, Paul, 2016. ‘AMISOM under Review,’ The RUSI 
Journal, 161:1, 40-49, DOI: 
10.1080/03071847.2016.1152120. 
Williams, Paul, 2017. ‘Global and Regional Peacekeeper: 
Trends, Opportunities, Risks and a Way Ahead,’ 
Global Policy, 8(1), 124-129. DOI 10.1111/1758-
5899.12393. 
Vinci, Anthony, 2006, “An Analysis and Comparison of 
Armed Groups in Somalia”, African Security 
Review, Vol. 15, Issue 1, 75-90  
Wondemagegnehu, Dawit Yohannes and Daniel 
Gebreegziabher Kebede, 2017. ‘AMISOM: 
Charting a new course for African peace 
missions,’ African Security Review, 26:2, 199-219. 
World Bank, 1991. Somalia: Crisis in public expenditure 
management: Volume I: Summary of Main 
Findings and Recommendations, Washington DC, 
World Bank, Country Operations Division, Eastern 
Africa Department, Report No. 8727-SO, March 8. 
World Bank, 2011. World Development Report 2011: 
Conflict, Security and Development. Washington 
DC. 
World Bank Group, 2016. ‘Aid Flows in Somalia: Analysis of 
aid flow data – 14 February 2016’, Mogadishu, 
Aid Coordination Unit. 
World Bank Group, 2017. ‘Aid Flows in Somalia: Analysis of 
aid flow data – April 2017’, Mogadishu, Aid 
Coordination Unit. 
Yihdego, Zeray W. 2007. “Ethiopia’s Military Action against 
the Union of Islamic Courts and others in 
Somalia: Some legal implications,” International 
Law Quarterly, 56, 666-676. 
Yusuf, Zakaria and Abdul Khalif, 2015. “Galkayo and 
Somalia’s Dangerous Faultlines,” In Pursuit of 
Peace blog, Crisis Group. 10 December. 
http://blog.crisisgroup.org/africa/somalia/2015/
12/10/galkayo-and-somalias-dangerous-
faultlines/, accessed 26 June 2017.
  
Find out more about the  
Conflict Research Programme 
 
Connaught House 
The London School of Economics  
and Political Science 
Houghton Street 
London WC2A 2AE 
 
Contact: 
Anna Mkhitaryan, Programme Manager 
Tel: +44 (0)20 7849 4631 
Email: Intdev.Crp@lse.ac.uk 
 
lse.ac.uk/conflict 
